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
SUTHERLAND'S

POLITICAL LETTERS,

ADDRESSED TO DR. NELSON.

Diagram of the Battle of Tippecanoe.

(SEE LETTER NO. III.)



1 Prescott, 3 Snelling, 5 Larabee, 7 Hawkins, U. S. inf. commanded by Major Floyd.—2 Brown, 4 Cook, 6 Peters, 8 Barton, U. S. inf. commanded by Captain Baen.—9 Scott, 11 Albright, Indiana militia, commanded by Major Redmond—10 Warwick, 12 Wilson, 13 Hargrove, 14 Wilkins, commanded by Lieut. Col. Decker.—15 Robb, 16 Geiger, mounted riflemen, commanded by Major Wells.—17 Spencer, mounted riflemen, commanded by Capt. Spencer.—18 —, 19 —, 20 Parke, dragoons, commanded by Major Daviess.

NEW-YORK.

1840.

LA

THREE

POLITICAL LETTERS,

ADDRESSED TO

DR. WOLFRED NELSON,

LATE OF LOWER CANADA, NOW OF PLATTSBURGH, N. Y.

BY TH: JEFFERSON SUTHERLAND.

NEW-YORK.

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1840.

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LETTER No. I.

New-York, June 4, 1840.

To Dr. WOLFRED NELSON,

Late of Lower Canada, now of Plattsburgh, N. Y.:

DEAR SIR—A gentleman who professes to reside in Clinton county, and to be acquainted with you, has just informed me that you are now engaging yourself in active measures for the support of the political party in our country, denominated and known as British Whigs; and that you are employing your influence with the people among whom you reside, in order to induce them, at the coming election, to cast their votes for General Harrison, and such other candidates as shall be proposed by the British Whig party, which has put him in nomination.

Robbed of your property and driven from your homes by a merciless British Government, you and others of your countrymen have sought an asylum within the borders of these states, where, by the blessings of Divine Providence, who made powerful the arm of our forefathers, and gave liberty to our country, the poor subject escaping from the dungeon of the despot, and no longer dreading the hand of his oppressor, may set himself down in quiet beside the banished noble, and the dethroned monarch, who here reside, fearless of the machinations of a corrupt court, or the waking vengeance of an injured people—and, here you have the undoubted right to attach yourself to whichever of our political parties your judgment or your partiality may direct, and it is not for me to say where, or where not, you shall use your influence. Yet, sir, as we are now engaged in a political contest of no ordinary importance—but one of the deepest interest not only to ourselves, but to those who shall follow after us, and in which, as I conceive, are put in issue the fundamental principles of democracy, and the question whether we shall longer remain as a free republic, with plain and simple laws, formed in accordance with democratic principles, and having effect alike upon the rich and the poor—or whether we are thus soon to be deprived of them and forced to accept of a gilded tyrannous aristocracy, who would tread us to the earth, I think myself justified in the course I have assumed.

It is but recently I saw you struggling for the liberties of your own country, and with your sword, endeavoring, as I supposed, to establish in the Canadas an independent DEMOCRATIC form of government, instead of the wicked and unjust colonial system, which was then, and is now still maintained therein by the bayonets of the British nation ; and then, being, as I am, an ardent admirer of democratic institutions, and an enthusiastic advocate of political freedom—and being moved in your behalf—and with the desire to obtain the small share of applause which might chance to accrue to one of the humble agents in the erection of another independent republic on the continent of America, I put on my sword and joined the people of your country with a view to give you aid : and, therefore, I believe it proper for me to inquire at this time whether you are now mistaken in your course—or, if I have been deceived as to your intentions.

You having once embarked in the effort to achieve the independence of your country, and having staked your fortune and your life in the cause, I am not willing to believe you have abandoned that cause ; and I must suppose you still to entertain the hope that your country, at no very distant day, will be able, in despite of the enemies of liberty on this side of the St. Lawrence, and the British power on the other, to assume a station among the independent nations of the earth. I must, also, believe that, at the present moment, in all your public acts, you have in view to promote the liberation of the Canadas from British thralldom ; and I cannot suppose that you and your compatriots in your late effort to rid yourselves of the odious domination of Great Britain, had nothing save independence for your country in view—but must still entertain the belief that the object of the struggle you commenced, was to raise up democratic institutions upon the ruins of British tyranny. Had I believed it your intention to establish any other form of government in the Canadas than that of a representative democracy—and that you had designed merely to rid the people of your country from one hateful evil, that you might saddle them with another as grievous, I should never have been with you.

There has been some opportunity afforded me to acquire an intimate knowledge of the affairs of the Canadas, and from such knowledge, I am satisfied that neither peace, repose, nor prosperity can be hoped for in them, while those provinces are under British Colonial rule. The parasites of present power will there hold on to their offices and sinecures with such tenacity, that nothing shall sever their hold but that instrument with which Alexander cut the gordian knot—the sword. Nothing but violent means can give to the Canadian people a government, or put an end to the trampling upon their rights by British tyrants !

And is not political liberty worth fighting for—and the freedom of a nation a proper justification for an appeal to arms? That it is so, the majority of the people of this country will bear witness. Yet, if no better change could be hoped for the Canadas than has been obtained for Greece, I must confess that my interest, or at least my interference, as well as that of the democratic part of my countrymen, would be most likely withheld. A Christian's dungeon is a matter of the same kind with a Mahometan's bowstring—nor is a Prince's sword of less abhorrence than a Pacha's scimeter, to an American freeman.

If, as I have supposed, you are desirous of establishing for your own country a democratic form of government, from whom in this country, allow me to inquire, do you expect sympathy and support for your people? Can you expect to find any honest feeling in your behalf, resting with the British Whigs of our country? Do you hope for assistance from that portion of our people who have put forward General Harrison as an available candidate for the Presidency?(1.) That you cannot, I believe

(1.) Copy of a Letter from the Chairman of the Central Committee of the British Whig Young Men of the State of New-York, accompanying a Circular distributed just previous to the nomination of General Harrison for the Presidency.

"Albany, Oct. 23, 1839.

"TO THE EDITOR OF THE SANGAMON JOURNAL:

"DEAR SIR:—I send you [CONFIDENTIALLY] a Circular which is circulating here, and is producing great effect. Mr. Clay cannot possibly get this State, or New-England. Our only hope is in Gen. Harrison, who is perfectly unexceptionable, and has no serious opposition to him on any possible ground. The leaders do not feel, perhaps, as sure of getting paid for their services as with other candidates who have impliedly come into their views. But we can make a glorious rally under *his banner*, and reach the hearts of the people, *with his services and virtues*. Gen. Scott has been pushed by a few Anti-Claymen, but it is all nonsense. I send you a pamphlet which is also circulating here, and which shows that no Jackson men or Clintonians can or will support him. The great point now is to have the public voice indicate a preference, or there may be fatal mistakes made at Harrisburg. I am the Chairman of the State Central Committee of Young Men, but do not speak officially. I should like to forward some papers and letters to your delegates, but their residence is not mentioned. Will you publish their residence and send me a paper?

"Yours truly,

S. DE WITT BLOODGOOD."

Extract from the Circular.

[*"CONFIDENTIAL."*]

"Our party leaders want sagacity, or as I prefer styling it, philosophy. They act as if mankind were always actuated by the best motives, and that the holding up an abstract truth, is the pledge of victory. Not so, Nations, like individuals, often rush blindly to ruin, from passion, prejudice, ambition, and many other causes. It is in vain to oppose their will when they take a particular bias. They who attempt it are sacrificed,

you will be made to understand. It is our democracy alone who will give you support. Those who compose the British Whig party cannot favor a revolution in the Canadas, without violating their own principles, and assailing the policy of their party—as any revolution in the Canadas, to be successful, must be carried on with a view not less for the establishment of a free representative republic—than for independence.

By consulting the pages of our history, you will be informed that when the people of this country assumed the sword, and stood forth upon their rights—when they took the field against British tyranny and the despotism of colonial rule, the object for which they united in their struggle, was independence. That then the experiment of a free democratic government had not been tried—and that when independence was gained for our country, our people were by no means unanimous in its adoption. While they had all, alike, entered heartily into the contest for independence, one part were for a democracy, and the other for an aristocracy. Jefferson, Franklin, and others, entertaining the same liberal principles, and who were front and foremost in the cause, were democrats, and battled for democracy (2.)

and thus history tells us with its monitory page, of the downfall of patriots vainly struggling against their erring countrymen, and finally of the downfall of the masses themselves. This is the law of nature and the will of Providence. Let us also apply this fact to politics. We cannot expect *perfection* in the people at large; we can only rely on their general good intentions, sustained by a consciousness that their own interests individually, are at stake with those of the mass. When they are right in the main, it is as much as we should expect. We cannot hope that they will cease to be men in order to please us. In this knowledge consists the tact of the Administration party. They studiously seek to know the public will, and they follow it long enough to profit by its force and power. How adroitly they availed themselves of the popularity of Jackson! By bad measures they have lost much of its advantage, and by prosecuting such a scheme as the Sub-Treasury, they will lose more. But still they are strongly entrenched, and we must carry their entrenchments, or be doomed to political slavery. How can this be done? Only by uniting on the man who has less opposition to him than another. *Superior or splendid talents or exalted claims are not the questions to be considered.*"

(2.) Thomas Jefferson was the author of the Declaration of Independence, and its sentiments may justly be considered peculiarly his. Here are the principles of true democracy, viz:

"That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed: that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying the foundation on such principles,

as well as independence, while Adams, Hamilton, and their associates, who had entered into the cause as ardently as the oth-

and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

These principles were upheld by the true republicans in the convention for the formation of our constitution.

GEORGE MASON of Virginia, (page 754-5 of the Madison Papers,) "argued strongly for an election of the larger branch [of the legislature] by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government." "We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people." "Every selfish motive, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest, than of the highest, order of citizens."

Again: page 914, "He took this occasion to repeat, that, notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a national government, he never would agree to abolish the state governments, or render them absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the general government, and he would be equally careful to preserve them."

Again: page 1209, "Having for his primary object—for the polar star of his political conduct—the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of civil liberty, that the great officers of state, and particularly the executive, should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in order that they may feel and respect those rights and interests which are again to be personally valuable to them."

MR. MADISON (p. 755,) "Considered the popular election of one branch of the national legislature as essential to every plan of free government."

MR. WILSON of Pennsylvania, page 801, said: "He wished for vigor in the government, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority. The government ought to possess, not only, first, the *force*, but second the *mind or sense*, of the people at large. The legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society. Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively."

JOHN DICKINSON, of Delaware, page 1213, said: "He doubted the policy of interweaving into a republican constitution a veneration for wealth. He had always understood that a veneration for poverty and virtue were the objects of republican encouragement."

In letter 117, vol. 4. of his correspondence, THOMAS JEFFERSON says: "I would say, that the people, being the only depository of power, should exercise in person every function which their qualifications enable them to exercise consistently with the order and security of society; that we now find them equal to the election of those who shall be invested with their executive and legislative powers, and to act themselves in the judiciary, as judges in questions of fact; that the range of their powers ought to be enlarged," &c.

Again: letter 131, "On this view of the import of the term *Republic*, instead of saying, as has been said, 'that it may mean any thing or nothing,' we may say, with truth and meaning, that governments are more or less republican, as they have more or less of the element of popular election and control in their composition: and believing, as I do, that the mass of the citizens is the safest depository of their own rights, and espe-

ers, for independence, but not for democracy, were aristocrats, and in favor of the establishment of an aristocratical government

cially that the evils flowing from the duperies of the people, are less injurious than those from the egoism of their agents, I am a friend to that composition of government which has in it the most of this ingredient."

Again, letter 132: "Our legislators are not sufficiently apprised of the rightful limits of their powers, that their true office is to declare and enforce only our natural rights and duties, to take none of them from us.—No man has a natural right to commit aggression on the equal rights of another; and this is all from which the laws ought to restrain him: Every man is under the natural duty of contributing to the necessities of the society, and this is all the laws should enforce on him: And no man having a natural right to be the judge between himself and another, it is his natural duty to submit to the umpirage of an impartial third. When the laws have declared and enforced all this, they have fulfilled their functions, and the idea is quite unfounded, that on entering into society we give up any natural right."

Again, letter 135: "At the birth of our republic, I committed that opinion to the world; in the draft of a constitution annexed to the Notes on Virginia, in which a provision was inserted for a representation permanently equal. The infancy of the subject at that moment, and our inexperience of self-government, occasioned gross departures in that draft, from genuine republican canons. In truth, the abuses of monarchy had so much filled all the space of political contemplation, that we imagined every thing republican that was not monarchy. We had not yet penetrated to the mother principle, that 'governments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of their people, and execute it.'—"The true foundation of republican government is the equal right of every citizen, in his person and property, and in their management. Try by this, as a tally, every provision of our constitution, and see if it hangs directly on the will of the people. Reduce your legislature to a convenient number for full, but orderly discussion. Let every man who fights or pays, exercise his just and equal right in their election. Submit them to approbation or rejection at short intervals. Let the executive be chosen in the same way, and for the same term, by those whose age he is to be; and leave no screen of a council behind which to skulk from responsibility."

Again, letter 149: "It should be remembered, as an axiom of eternal truth in politics, that whatever power in any government is independent, is absolute also; in theory only, at first, while the spirit of the people is up, but in practice, as fast as that relaxes. Independence can be trusted no where but with the people in mass. They are inherently independent of all but moral law."

Again, letter 172: "Ours, (the object of the republican party,) on the contrary, was to maintain the will of the majority of the convention, and of the people themselves. We believed, with them, that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and protected in right, by moderate powers, confided to persons of his own choice, and held to their duties by dependence on his own will. We believed that the complicated organization of kings, nobles, and priests, was not the wisest nor best to effect the happiness of associated men; that wisdom and virtue were not hereditary; that the trappings of such a machinery con-

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for our country.(3.) The persons who composed this aristocratic party were at first called Federalists.

sumed by their expense those earnings of industry they were meant to protect, and, by the inequalities they produced, exposed liberty to sufferance. We believed that men, enjoying in ease and security the full fruits of their own industry, enlisted by all their interests on the side of law and order, habituated to think for themselves, and follow their reason as their guide, would be more easily and safely governed, than with minds nourished in error, and vitiated and debased, as in Europe, by ignorance, indigence and oppression. The cherishment of the people then was our principle, the fear and distrust of them, that of the other party."

In the philanthropic and consoling faith of a true democrat, Mr. Jefferson lived and died. But ten days before his death, in reference to the Declaration of Independence and its fruits, he said, letter 193:

"May it be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-government. That form which we have substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man.—The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favorite few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God."

These extracts distinctly show that broad differences of opinion existed among the Fathers of the Republic. These differences exhibited themselves in the conventions to form the state constitutions, and more strikingly in the convention that formed the federal constitution. The democratic principle struggled to give the people as direct a control as possible over the general government, leaving to the states all powers not absolutely necessary to the general welfare, while the anti-democratic sought to supersede the state governments, and remove the executive and senatorial branches of the general government entirely, and the representative as far as practicable, from the popular control. With some concessions to the anti-democratic party in the election of the executive and senate, which the spirit of our people has rendered nugatory in practice, the constitution offered to the people of the states was essentially democratic, and was adopted with a few explanatory amendments.

(3.) As early as 1787, JOHN ADAMS, than whom no man entered with more energy and devotion into the cause of the revolution, wrote and published a series of letters on government, under the title of "A defence of the Constitutions of the United States of America;" in which the principles of the anti-democratic party were clearly developed. A few extracts will suffice. In his preface he says—"The rich, the well born, and the able, acquire an influence among the people, that will soon be too much for simple honesty and plain sense in a house of representatives. The most illustrious of these must, therefore, be separated from the mass and placed by themselves in a senate."

In his 20th letter he says: "I only contend that the English constitution is in theory, the most stupendous fabric of human invention, both for the adjustment of the balance and the prevention of its vibrations ;

Now, although the persons who then formed the Democratic party, as well as those of whom the Federal party were made

and that the Americans ought to be applauded instead of censured, for imitating it as far as they have."

In his 26th letter he says: "If there is then in society such a natural aristocracy as these great writers pretend, and as all history and experience demonstrate, formed partly by genius, partly by birth, and partly by riches, how shall the legislator avail himself of their influence for the equal benefit of the public? And how, on the other hand, shall he prevent them from disturbing the public happiness? I answer by arranging them all, or at least the most conspicuous of them together in one assembly, by the name of a Senate; by separating them from all pretensions to the executive power; and by controlling, in the legislature, their ambition and avarice, by an assembly of representatives on one side, and by the executive authority on the other."

In his 27th letter he says: "If I should undertake to say, that there never was a good government in the world, that did not consist of the three species, of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, I think I may make it good."

In his 29th letter he says: "I shall show in another place, that a nobility or gentry, in a popular government, not overbalancing it, is the very life and soul of it."

In his 32d letter he says: "The only remedy is, to throw the rich and the proud into one group, in a separate assembly, and there tie their hands; if you give them scope with the people at large, or their representatives, they will destroy *all equality and liberty, with the consent and acclamation of the people themselves.*"

In letter 52, he says: "*The distinctions of poor and rich are as necessary in states of considerable extent, as labor and good government. The poor are destined to labor; and the rich, by the advantages of education, independence and leisure, are qualified for superior stations.*"

Again: "When the three natural orders in society, the high, the middle, and the low, are all represented in the government and constitutionally placed to watch each other, and restrain each other mutually by the laws, it is then only that an emulation takes place for the public good, and divisions turn to the advantage of the nation."

The whole work is interspersed with sentiments of a similar nature, clearly showing the author's opinion, that the people are incapable of self government, and that the only good system is a king, lords, and commons, representing three distinct orders in society.

The same distrust of the people was evinced, and the same opinions as to government, were expressed in the convention of 1787, which formed the present constitution of the United States. Mr. MADISON, in his introduction to the debates in that body, recently published, among the circumstances attending its meeting, mentions the following:

"It was found moreover, that those least partial to popular government, or most distrustful of its efficacy were yielding to anticipations that from an increase of the confusion, a government might result more congenial with their taste or their opinions; whilst those most devoted to the principles and forms of republics, were alarmed for the cause of liberty itself, at stake in the American experiment, and anxious for a system that would avoid the inefficacy of a mere confederacy without passing into the opposite extreme of a consolidated government. It was known that there were

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individuals who had betrayed a bias towards monarchy, and there had always been some not unfavorable to the partition of the Union into several confederacies, either from a better chance of figuring on a sectional theatre, or that the sections would require stronger governments, or by their hostile conflicts lead to a monarchical consolidation."

The succeeding debates contain abundant evidences that the principles of John Adams had their advocates among the ablest men in the convention.

Mr. HAMILTON said: (Madison Papers, pages 385, 6, 7, 8, 9,) "In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was, by the opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British government was the best in the world; and he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America."

Again: "The progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British constitution, namely, that it is the only government in the world which unites public strength with individual security."

Again: "Their House of Lords is a most noble institution." "No temporary senate will have firmness enough to answer the purpose."

Again: "As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question; for can there be a good government without a good executive! The English model was the only good one on that subject."

Again: "What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the legislature hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior. Let the executive also be for life."

He submitted his plan to the convention, avowing, however, that he did not expect the people to adopt it "*at present*." "But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved—he sees evils operating in the states which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies—he sees that a great progress has been already made, and is still going on in the public mind. He thinks, therefore, the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices," &c.

His plan was an assembly elected by the people, a senate elected by electors chosen by the people in districts, to hold their offices during good behaviour, and a governor elected by electors chosen by the people in the senatorial districts, to hold during good behavior; and that the governors of the states should be appointed by the general governor, *with an absolute negative on acts passed by the state legislatures*.

Governor Morris, speaking of the second branch in the executive department, or the senate, (pages 1018-19-20,) says:

"One interest must be opposed to another interest; vices as they exist, must be turned against each other. In the second place, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to lord it through pride." "If the second branch is to be dependent, we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so; he hoped so. The rich will strive to establish their dominion and enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper security against them, is to form them into a separate interest."

of politicians; and although the parties, during the last forty years, have gone through a number of changes and formations, the principles of the two parties are found to have remained entire, and they are now fallen back upon their original positions.

The democracy of our country, as a party, is the same now it was in 1798, and the aristocratic party, who were then known as federalists, and now as British Whigs, occupy the very same ground they did when they were first signally defeated by the democracy of the country; and so much in unison are the principles of this aristocratic part of our people with those of the aristocracy of Great Britain, they seem as of one and the same family. The British Whigs who have put General Harrison in nomination for the Presidency, are the own blood relations and cousin-germans to the British Whigs who sustain Lord Melbourne and his associates. The one party is the representative of the wealth of the British nation—the other is the representative of the same wealth, and the wealth and moneyed aristocracy of our own country.

In England the British Whigs have chosen a monarch, who is stamped by nature with that distinctive weakness, which even in their own dominions, deprives her from any participation or trust in the execution of their laws, or the administration of the government, save the office of tool, which she now performs to the aristocracy. In this country the British Whigs have put in nomination a candidate for the presidency, who is known to be in the imbecility of age; and who, when he was in the proudest days of manhood, had not confidence in his own capacity to hold his place in a high and exalted station—but relinquished it, while it offered him honor, and fame, and glory, fearful he should sink with disgrace under the responsibility by which the station was

Again: "He contended that the executive should appoint the senate, and fill up vacancies."

Again: "He did not hesitate to say, that loaves and fishes must bribe the demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices under the general than under the state governments. A senate for life will be a noble bait."

Again: (page 1030,) "State attachments, and state importance, have been the bane of this country. We cannot annihilate, but we may perhaps take out the teeth of the serpents."

Again: (page 1033,) On the proposition for fixing the representation in the first branch, at "one member for every forty thousand inhabitants," he thought property ought to be taken into the estimate, as well as the number of inhabitants. Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value than property. An accurate view of the matter would, nevertheless, prove that property was the main object of society."

Again: (page 1043,) "As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there never was nor ever will be a civilized society without an aristocracy. His endeavor was, to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief."

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accompanied. The only qualities they claim for him are negativity—and the only ground he offers for their liking is his suppliancy—and the certainty, if elected, that he will be as subservient to the British Whigs of this country as the British Queen is to the aristocracy in England.

In opposition to General Harrison, the democracy of our country offer Martin Van Buren as a candidate for a re-election to the Presidency. He is selected from among our free citizens, because he is known to possess capacity of the highest order, and principles corresponding with those of the democratic party; while the candidate of the British Whig party is *allowed* to possess no principles of his own, as he is, (if elected,) to be made to represent the principles of the party—which they dare not now avow.

As they have their candidate's assent to be made to represent the principles of the British Whig party, it is *not* essential to them that he holds opinions in common with the aristocracy. Their only object at this time is to get into power; the principles by which the president, of their choice, is to be governed, is but a secondary consideration, according to their scheme, to be settled in convention, after they have succeeded in his election—which they hope to do by keeping him entirely from the observation of the people, surrounded by a committee(4.) who

(4.)

"Oswego, Jan. 31, 1840.

"TO THE HON. WILLIAM H. HARRISON:

"DEAR SIR: In accordance with a resolution of the Union Association of Oswego, I am instructed to propose three questions to you in relation to subjects that a large portion of this section of the country feel a deep interest in. The first is—

"Are you in favor of receiving and referring petitions for the immediate abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?

"Second—Are you in favor of an United States Bank, or some institution similar to that, for the safe keeping and disbursing of the public moneys, and for giving an uniform currency throughout the United States.

"And lastly—Would you favor the passage of a general bankrupt law by Congress, so that its operations might be equal in all the States in the Union.

"I have only to say, sir, that the above enquiries are made in accordance with the unanimous wishes of this Association, the members of which, I am instructed to say, entertain the highest regard for your past services, and hope, should you be elected to the high office for which you are nominated, that nothing may occur to lessen you in the estimation of a great and free people. I am sir, respectfully, your ob't servant,

"MILES HOTCHKISS, Corresponding Secretary."

"Cincinnati, Feb. 29, 1840.

"OSWEGO UNION ASSOCIATION:

"GENTLEMEN: Your letter of the 31st ult. addressed to Gen. Harrison, has been placed in our possession with a view to early attention. This

act in the capacity of the attachés of a British lord—or the ladies of the bed-chamber to *Her Majesty*—while their mercenary prints patch him up on one side as a general and a hero, and on the other as a farmer, and the poor man's friend. (5.)

is unavoidable, in consequence of the very numerous letters daily received by the General, and to which his reply, in person, is rendered absolutely impracticable. As from his confidential committee, you will look upon this response, and if the policy observed by the committee should not meet with your approbation, you will attribute the error rather to ourselves and his immediate advisers, than General Harrison. That policy is, **THAT THE GENERAL MAKE NO FURTHER DECLARATION OF HIS PRINCIPLES, FOR THE PUBLIC EYE, WHILST OCCUPYING HIS PRESENT POSITION.** Such a course has been adopted, not for purpose of concealment, nor to avoid all proper responsibility; but under the impression that the General's views, in regard to all the important and exciting questions of the day, have heretofore been given to the public, fully and explicitly; and that those views, whether connected with constitutional or other questions of very general interest, have undergone no change. The committee are strengthened in regard to the propriety of this policy; *that no new issue be made to the public, from the consideration that the National Convention deemed it impolitic, at the then crisis, to publish any general declaration of the views of the great Opposition party, and certainly the policy at the present remains unaltered.* In the mean time, we cannot help expressing the hope that our friends every where will receive the nomination of General Harrison with something akin to generous confidence. When we reflect upon the distinguished intelligence of the nominating convention—how ably all interests were represented in that body, we certainly have a high guarantee that should General Harrison be the successful candidate for the Presidency, that office will be happily and constitutionally administered, and under the guidance of the same principles which directed our Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. Believing you will concur with us in the propriety of the policy adopted, we have pleasure in subscribing ourselves,

"Your friends,

"DAVID GWYNNE,

"J. C. WRIGHT,

"O. M. SPENCER.

"H. E. SPENCER, Corresponding Secretary."

(5.) General Harrison while Governor of the Territory of Indiana approved of a law of which the following is an extract:

A LAW TO REGULATE ELECTIONS.

Sec. 3, last clause, (the first clause is concerning the oath of judges of elections.)

"It is therefore enacted, that every free male inhabitant of the age of twenty-one years; resident in the Territory, and who has been a citizen of any State in the Union, or who hath been two years resident in the Territory, and holds a freehold in fifty acres of land within any county of the same, or any less quantity in the county in which he shall reside, which, with the improvements made thereon, shall be of the value of one hundred dollars, or who has paid for, and in virtue of a deed of covenant for further assurances from a person vested with the fee, is in actual possession of fifty acres of land, subject to taxation in the county in which he shall be resident, shall be and are hereby declared to be duly

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I must take the occasion to remark, that their candidate may be a *hero* and a *great general*.(6.) Yet, it is shown by the histo-

qualified electors of Representatives for the counties in which they are respectively resident.

JESSE B. THOMAS, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

B. CHAMBERS, President of the Council.

Approved, 17th Sept. 1807.

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

INDIANA, to wit:—I, William J. Brown, Secretary of State, for the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the last clause of the third section of "A law to regulate elections," which is now on file, in manuscript form, in my office.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and have affixed [L. s.] the seal of said State, at Indianapolis, this 5th day of June, A. D. 1840.

WM. J. BROWN, Secretary of State.

(6.) It appears that the ladies of Chillicothe so estimated his (General Harrison's) services, that at the same time their husbands prepared a sword for Col. Croghan, they prepared for him a petticoat.

Dayton, April 20, 1836.

MR. BILGER—In compliance with your request, I submit to the public a true statement, (as far as I am acquainted with the circumstance,) in relation to certain ladies of Chillicothe having prepared a PETTICOAT TO PRESENT TO GEN. HARRISON at the time the sword was presented to the gallant Col. Croghan.

I arrived at Chillicothe, some time in the fall or winter of 1814, and distinctly and clearly recollect that the subject of the Petticoat, at that time, was all the town talk. The father and mother of my wife, Mr. John Munday, now dead, informed me of the whole transactions; I also heard the particulars from Mrs. Stephen Sissna, now old and blind, and who resides in Highland county. These persons were old settlers of Chillicothe. Mr. Munday, who had seen the petticoat, informed me that it was of "many colors," and so stiffly quilted that it would nearly stand alone. Mr. James Foster, with whom I was employed for some length of time as a book binder, had also seen the petticoat, and one day when we were engaged stitching a pamphlet in relation to the surrender of Gen. Hull, he remarked to me that he wished he had a print of a petticoat, and that if he had it, he would put it in a frame so as to preserve it. At Dr. Basey's tavern, where I then boarded, it was common talk almost every day; the names of the ladies were mentioned, and I believe I now am able to give the names, if requested, of most of them. I mention these facts to show that they are of such a character that I could not forget or mistake them. In all the conversations I ever heard upon the subject, I never heard it denied whilst I resided in Chillicothe, but I do recollect of hearing one, if not more of the ladies' husband's say, that the petticoat would have been presented to the General, had they not interfered. There are many citizens of Chillicothe who recollect the facts I have stated. There is one gentleman in the Ohio Delegation in Congress who, I am well persuaded remembers the circumstance well. That the ladies prepared and intended presenting the petticoat, is as undoubted a fact, as that the sword was presented to Col. Croghan. If any particular reference to the old citizens of Chillicothe, will be of any service, I will freely give the same. Respectfully yours, JOHN ANDERSON.

rical records of our nation, that he resigned his office as a general while our country was in the midst of a war; and that when the Indian war-whoop was resounding along our borders from Lake Michigan to the River St. Johns—when the homes of our frontier settlers were smoking in ruins, and our soil was being dyed with the blood of our best citizens—and when British ships were hovering on our coast, blockading our ports, and landing their murderous bands of soldiers upon every defenceless spot, destroying our peaceful inhabitants, and despoiling our country, he abandoned us and left us to fight out our battles and to defend our country without his assistance. I would also remark, that General Harrison may be a *farmer*. But, nevertheless, it is known that he has preferred the subservient employment of a clerk in a petty court of law, to the more honorable, though, perhaps, more laborious and hardy occupation of ploughing and planting; and that he may be the poor man's friend—but this must be doubted, from the fact that he approved of a law in Indiana, and afterwards voted for a similar one in the Ohio legislature, providing that the poor man who could not pay his fine and cost of suit, on a conviction for a misdemeanor, should be sold as a slave to the highest bidder, (7.) and subjected to the

(7.) Extract from the Territorial Laws of Indiana, Revised Code, 1807, page 39 and 40—Section 11, 30 and 31.

"AN ACT RESPECTING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

"Section 11. If any person shall unlawfully assault or threaten another in any menacing manner, or shall strike or wound another, he shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars; and the court before whom such conviction shall be had, may, in their discretion, cause the offender to enter into recognizance with surety for the peace and good behaviour, for a term not exceeding one year.

"Sec. 30. When any person or persons shall, on conviction of any crime or breach of any penal law, be sentenced to pay a fine or fines, with or without the costs of prosecution, it shall and may be lawful for the court, before whom such conviction shall be had, to order the sheriff to sell or hire the person or persons so convicted, to service to any person or persons who will pay the said fine and costs for such term of time as the said court shall judge reasonable; and if such person or persons so sentenced and hired, or sold, shall abscond from the service of his or her master or mistress before the term of such servitude shall be expired, he or she so absconding shall, on conviction before a justice of the peace, be whipped with thirty-nine stripes, and shall, moreover, serve two days for every one so lost.

"Sec. 31. The judges of the several courts of record in this Territory shall give this act in charge to the grand jury at each and every court in which a grand jury shall be sworn."

JESSE B. THOMAS, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

B. CHAMBERS, President of the Senate.

Approved, 17th Sept. 1807.

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

INDIANA, to wit:—I, William J. Brown, Secretary of State, for the

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lash, while the rich man, (though a rogue of the deepest dye,) should be permitted to go free on giving a little from his great store of wealth.

State aforesaid, do hereby certify, that the foregoing is a true copy of the 11th, 30th, and 31st sections of "An Act respecting crimes and punishments," now on file, in manuscript form, in my office.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and here affixed [L. s.] the seal of the said State at Indianapolis, this 5th day of June, A. D. 1840.

WM. J. BROWN, Secretary of State.

In approving this act, Gen. Harrison showed that he considered liberty and property equal in consideration. The rich man's money, and the poor man's liberty, were balanced against each other. The rich man might pay the penalty with his money and go free; but the poor man's liberty must be taken to pay it. Gen. Harrison's act considers money and liberty of the same value!!

Extract from the Journal of the Senate of Ohio.

"Tuesday, January 30, 1821.—Senate met pursuant to adjournment.

"The Senate then, according to the order of the day, resolved itself into a committee of the whole, upon the bill from the House, entitled "An Act for the punishment of certain offences therein named," and after some time spent therein, the speaker, (Allen Trimble,) resumed the chair.

"Mr. FITHIAN then moved to strike out the nineteenth section of said bill, as follows:

"Be it further enacted, that when any person shall be imprisoned, either upon execution or otherwise, for the non-payment of a fine or costs, or both, it shall be lawful for the Sheriff of the county, to sell out such person as a SERVANT to any person within this State, who will pay the whole amount due, for the shortest period of service, of which sale, public notice shall be given at least ten days, and upon such sale being effected, the Sheriff shall give to the purchaser a certificate thereof, and deliver over the prisoner to him, from which time the relation between such purchaser and the prisoner shall be that of MASTER and SERVANT, until the time of service expires; and for injuries done by either, remedy shall be had in the same manner, as is, or may be provided by law in the case of master and apprentices; but nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent persons being discharged from imprisonment according to the provisions of the thirty-seventh section of this act to which this is supplementary, if it shall be considered expedient to grant such discharge: Provided, that the Court, in pronouncing sentence upon any person or persons convicted under this act or the act to which this is supplementary, may direct such person or persons to be detained in prison until the fine be paid, or the person or persons otherwise disposed of, agreeably to the provisions of this act."

"Which motion was decided in the affirmative, yeas 20, nays 12.

"And the yeas and nays being required, those who voted in the affirmative were Messrs. Beasley, Brown, Fithian, Gass, Heaton, Jennings, Lucas, Mathews, McLaughlin, McMillin, Newcomb, Robb, Russell, Scofield, Shelby, Spencer, Stone, Swearingen, Thompson, Womeldorf—20.

"And those who voted in the negative, were Messrs. Baldwin, Cole, Foos, Foster, [WM. H.] HARRISON, McLean, Oswall, Pollock, Rugles, Roberts, Wheeler and Speaker—12."

But to return : While a prisoner to the British government in Canada, I was told by one of their nobility, a patented legislator, "that all my ideas of the establishment of a democratic government in the Canadas were chimerical—that such could not long exist where they had been established in my own country—but would necessarily be changed into an aristocracy." Then, said he, "the mass of the people of every country must remain ignorant—and it is impossible to have them ever become so enlightened as to make it safe to allow them to participate in the administration of the government"—and "that some must be made permanently great, to keep down the vulgar mass ;" and this appears to be the precise principle of General Harrison and the party who have put him up for the suffrages of our people. Do not those who control the party, found their hopes of his election upon the supposed ignorance and want of intelligence of the mass of our voters ? If it be not so, why have they waived all appeal to the good sense of the people, and approached them only with devices which are comprehended by their grosser natural, and unimproved understanding ? Or, does their own stupidity induce them to believe that they can beguile intelligent and thinking people, or any who are worthy to be called democrats, by the vulgar song of the bacchanalian—or entice them by the epauletted picture of an old and womanish general, impressed on a napkin—or catch them with coon-skins in log cabins—or purchase their votes with hard cider, dealt out to them with a gourd shell ?

This assumed lowliness of the British Whigs, is but a crouching of themselves to make a spring for power. If their party made any pretensions to democratic principles, and were honest in those pretensions, they would scorn such devices as they employ, which should be used only among slaves. But they make no pretensions to democracy. They are open and avowed aristocrats—and their devices are used as the instruments of a game for political power ; and we may be assured that power got by such fraudulent means, would be dishonestly held and vilely used.

General Harrison, and his party, are abolitionists(8.).—(mock

Secretary of State's Office, Columbus Ohio, Sept. 10, 1836.

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate copy from the Journals of the State of Ohio, being the first session of the 19th General Assembly, held at Columbus, December, 1836.

See page 303, 304, 305. CARTER B. HARLAN, Sec. of State.

(8.) In 1822 General Harrison writes as follows:

"At the age of eighteen, I BECAME A MEMBER OF AN ABOLITION SOCIETY, established at Richmond, the object of which was to ameliorate the condition of slaves, and procure their freedom by every legal means. My venerable friend Judge Gatch, of Clermont co., was

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philanthropy)—and so are the aristocracy of Great Britain—who are the enslavers of your country, and the common enemies to the liberty of mankind. While Ireland is laid prostrate and bleeding under their feet—while one hundred and fifty millions of Hindoos are trodden to the earth by their merciless bands of soldiers, and chained to a slavery of the vilest kind, they have emancipated a few thousand of negroes in the West Indies—yet not for so benevolent a purpose as some suppose, but, as I was informed by a British officer of rank, while a prisoner in Canada, *to fit them for military officers, to be inducted into our country in case of a war with us, to raise and arm the slaves of the south against us*—and to aid in this benevolent scheme, it is boasted by the British Whig party, that General Harrison desires an appropriation of all the surplus revenues of our government. (9.)

General Harrison and his party are bankers and monopolists. They have avowed their intention, if they can get the power of our government into their hands, to create a national bank, to whose vaults they will carry the treasures of the government—where they shall be controlled by the British aristocracy, who will own the stock of the institution. To my notion, the principle of banking, as now carried on in our country, and proposed to be continued by the British Whig party, is anti-democratic. The banks, it is true, throw out upon the people a large amount of imaginary money. But what more does this do than to enable the rich speculator to increase his already overgrown store, by doubling and trebling the price of property, without doing anything to enhance its value? The mechanic and the laboring man is told, however, that by the existence of banks and bank bills in our country, they get twice the amount for their services which would be given, if they did not exist. This may be true. But can they lay up the more? I believe not. For they must make a great discount, on every occasion, from the currency they receive before it will pay for the necessities of life, even

also a member of this society, and has lately given me a certificate that I was one. The obligations which I then came under, I have faithfully performed.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON."

Read also his letter to William B. Calhoun, in 1840. Here is an extract.

"While only 18 years of age, in Virginia, I joined an Abolition Society, and with others, pledged myself to do every thing in my power to effect the emancipation of slaves. I was to inherit a large property in slaves, and subsequently not only emancipated my own, but purchased others for the purpose of emancipating them. WM. HENRY HARRISON."

(9.) "Should I be asked if there is no way by which the general government can aid the cause of emancipation, I answer, that it has long been an object near my heart, to see the whole of its surplus revenues appropriated to that object.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON."

at a double price; and then, the rent of a shop or dwelling, is always more than treble what it would be in the absence of a flood of paper money. So that the speculator, the land holder, and the money dealer are the only gainers—while all the producing classes are losers. A few banking institutions might be regarded tolerable, as a kind of necessary evil, for commercial purposes; but the natural tendency and undeviating course of such institutions are to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer—to create a broad distance between the condition of a few—very rich, and the many—very poor.

Co-existent with us, as a nation, a party favorable to an aristocracy—to the existence of different orders in our government, was formed—and has been continued in our country. My authority for the assertion is the record of the times—and with this party we have always found the banking interest united. (10.) Observation has shown it to be true in the main that whenever there has been a new bank created, a new batch of aristocrats come forth, equal in number with the persons who constituted its board of directors. Though they may have been democrats, they could not convert the bank to democracy—but the bank has been sure to convert them to aristocracy.

(10.) Extract from the Address of the Democratic members of the New-York Legislature.

"Hamilton was the leading spirit of the cabinet, (Washington's.) More, as to the future character of the government, depended on the organization and administration of the treasury department, at that time, than on any other department of the government; and Hamilton, true to his principles, set about constructing a system which should create an influence in congress sufficient to counteract the will of the people and assimilate that body to the corrupt parliament of Great Britain. A large amount of certificates of public debt for articles furnished during the revolutionary war, was out standing, which had been purchased by speculators, at half to one-tenth of their nominal amount. Hamilton proposed to fund these at par, and a majority being secured for the project, some of the members were enabled to make large sums of money, buying them up indirectly, before the bill passed. His next project was the assumption of the state debts contracted during the revolutionary war, and then much depressed, in relation to which much the same game was played. These means secured temporarily a majority in congress. But, says Mr. Jefferson, 'some engine of influence more permanent, must be contrived, while these myrmidons were still in place to carry it through all opposition. THIS ENGINE WAS THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.' While the government remained at Philadelphia, a selection of members of both houses were constantly kept as directors, who on every question interesting to that institution, or the views of the federal head, voted at the will of that head; and together with the stockholding members, could always make the federal vote that of a majority. By this combination, legislative expositions were given to the constitution, and all the administrative laws were shaped on the model of England and so passed."

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"Ask me not," says Lavater, "if I am loved? But for what? If I am hated? But why?" This, sir, forms a proper text for an inquiry into the character of the British Whig party.

Every British aristocrat who lands on our shores, while he condemns and rails at our Democratic party, and our democratic institutions, is always found to have pockets full of compliments and praises for the principles of the British Whig party. Every British merchant or speculator resident in our country—be he Tory or Whig in England—is a British Whig here. Is not this an evidence of an unison of principle? Most certainly. The British foresee that a continuance of the extended intercourse and commercial relations which now exist between the two countries, must necessarily result in the formation of two republics or two aristocracies. England must become a republic, or the United States is changed to an aristocracy like England. A war between the two countries, it is true, might defer the result for a time—but nevertheless, it must so happen eventually. Then is it not natural, and to be expected, that there will be unison of feeling—and unison of action between the aristocrats of America and Great Britain?

The fact cannot be unknown to you, that this British Whig party, which is made up of the aristocrats known as federalists in 1798—with those who opposed our war with Great Britain in 1812—and those who are now clamoring for more banks, appear to be terribly alarmed at the thought of a war with Great Britain. Think you they fear her power? They do not.

The well organized bands of Great Britain have been met by the undisciplined yeomanry of our country, and defeated—and they may be again. Great Britain could never subdue us with her sword—and the British Whigs know that fact. There is nothing to dread in the power of Great Britain—but we have this to fear—she may destroy our democracy by corrupting our people with her money and her goods. It is not a fear of the power of British arms which occasions the aristocratic part of our people to mourn at the mere thought of a war—but they fear a war with Great Britain, because it would put far away the accomplishment of their desires, and the hope of fixing upon our country *an aristocratic form of government!*

Again: It is proposed by the British Whig party, that the general government should assume the debts contracted by the different states that have been pursuing a mad career of speculation, in what has been termed internal improvements—and that the public domain should be sold, and the proceeds applied to pay off the banks, which are now in the hands of the British; having been bought up with their goods which they have forced upon our people, and for which they could not get specie. This

gives to the British aristocracy a direct and immediate interest in the result of the present contest.(11.) The democracy of our

(11.) Extract of a Letter from a London correspondent to N. Y. paper.

London, April 1, 1840.

"DEAR SIR—I cheerfully avail myself of this opportunity to write you. I did not receive yours till the 23d ult.

"You I know, will be astonished when I inform you that our capitalists are more concerned about the decision of the States in regard to your next President, than you are—judging from the tenor of your last letter. The policy pursued by the Democratic party of your country, and sustained by the government at Washington, is alarmingly disadvantageous to the rich capitalists of this country—and hence every item of news goes to establish an opinion that your President and his ministers are losing ground, is received with astonishing avidity; and the general morning salute in Thread-and-needle-street is, 'Any thing later from the U. States?' The great question of discussion now is, 'Will the United States persist in recommending the Sub-Treasury Law?' and this one question,

"Like Aaron's serpent, swallows up the rest."

"It is the general opinion here, that if this project is carried out, the consequences will be serious to our manufactures, and also to all other capitalists. * * * * *

"For it is the policy of Great Britain, as all men know, to keep America, and indeed all other countries in debt to her, that she may make them tributary to her, and dependent upon her; and it is a common boast here, that the United States, though 'free and independent,' are nevertheless as much colonies of Great Britain as ever they were; and that though they make their own laws, yet Great Britain has something to say about that business also; because she has such a vast amount of money in the States that she can always have a party in her interest there, strong enough to keep things nearly as she wishes them to be. This was a common talk here a while ago, but the Sub-Treasury bill has caused them 'to waive the conversation' lately, and now it is feared that the British Government will be beset with such difficulties as will cause the throne to totter to its base.' * * * * *

"It was thought a while ago, that the plan proposed by Messrs. Baring & Co., which received the sanction of the leaders of the Whig party of the United States, but was anticipated in your national Senate by the Democratic portion thereof, before it could be brought forward by the Whig members as a public measure, would be adopted, and that the American Government would take upon itself the responsibility of paying those debts, but now there is no hope. It seems from all we can gather from the newspapers and letters which we receive, that the U. States are determined to cut off all communications with this country; and it is said by the knowing ones here, that unless the present administration is defeated at the next presidential election, or unless it reverses its policy on the currency question, it will lead, not merely to a dangerous crisis, but prove a death-blow to the prosperity of England.

"Mr. ——— remarked with great emphasis, the other day—and I place great confidence in what he says, 'that if the candidate of the American financiers, Gen. Harrison, was not elected, the great financial system of England, might bid farewell, a long farewell, to all its greatness,' and that a complete revolution in all our government affairs would follow; as

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country are opposed to the assumption of these state debts by the general government, as unconstitutional, and as unjust in its effect upon the people—which would be as much so, as to require the industrious and discreet man to contribute to pay the debts of his profligate neighbor.

With a hope of having the payment of these state bonds, held by the British, provided for by our general government, they have undertaken to assist in the elevation of General Harrison, and their friends, the British Whig party; and to accomplish this, as I have it on good authority, they are about to send into our country large sums of money, to be used for bribery and betting—and otherwise to be expended in the attempt to produce an influence with our voters in behalf of their friends here—who propose no measures which do not directly favor the withdrawal of the power of the government from the people. One of the leading measures of the British Whig party, is to carry on a series of internal improvements in certain of the states at the expense of the national treasury. (12.) Now, what could be the effect of this measure but consolidation—resulting in a demand for an extent and increase of the powers of the general government, which would thus be made to require strengthening—and must necessarily be followed by the surrender of the rights of the people to a powerful aristocracy.

one, though not the least of the effects of the Sub-Treasury law of the United States.

"Our papers here, openly declare, that it is necessary for the healthy maintenance of our equilibrium, and a perpetuation of monarchy, that the Democratic party of America, should be put down; and, though I take no part in these questions, yet I am inclined to the same opinion."

(12.) That General Harrison is in favor of this measure, is clear. In the House of Representatives on the 18th of March 1818, when he was a member, the following Resolutions were brought up for action, and voted for by him.

"1. That Congress has power under the Constitution, to appropriate money for the construction of post roads, military, and other roads, of canals, and for the improvement of water courses.

"On the vote being taken, it was decided in the negative, ayes 60, noes 75. [*Harrison* amongst the ayes.]

"2. That Congress has power under the Constitution to construct post roads, and military roads, provided, that private property be not taken for public use without just compensation. [82 ayes, 84 noes. *Harrison* amongst the ayes.]

"3. That Congress has power under the Constitution to construct roads and canals necessary for commerce between the States, provided that private property be not taken for public purposes without just compensation. [74 ayes, 95 noes, *Harrison* amongst the ayes.]

"4. That Congress has power under the Constitution, to construct canals for military purposes, provided that no private property be taken for any such purpose, without just compensation being made therefor. [81 ayes, 83 noes, *Harrison* amongst the ayes.]"

I would now, sir, inquire, if you are willing to be numbered in the ranks of a party, whose principles are thus shown to be anti-democratic—or to be found laboring for the interests of the oppressors of your own country, and the enemies of liberty in ours? Do you suppose, sir, that by giving your support to that party, you will in any manner contribute to benefit the cause of your country, or find favor for your unfortunate people? If you do, in my judgement you greatly err. Do you doubt the influence of British gold? Then look at the bell-weather of the aristocracy of our country. He is marked with \$52,000, the price at which he was bought. You may see many others in the party labeled with the rate of their purchase; and have not these all, all, been among the first to traduce your people—to oppose the cause of your country—and to libel and villify those of our citizens who have offered to give you assistance in your struggle?

By assisting to put the government of this country into the hands of a party acting upon such principles as are shown to belong to the British Whigs—such principles as are inscribed upon their banners—you will not only make yourself an instrument in fixing incalculable evil upon this republic, but you will be the means of assisting to rivet the chains of the British aristocracy upon your own country.

For the Canadas, I have yet hopes—although their soil is now held by Great Britain with a glittering and panoplied host, which I have seen. Yes, I have seen them exhibiting “all the pomp and circumstance of war,” and moving with “the pride and perfectness of discipline;” and I have been oppressed with a feeling of humiliation when I have reflected what discipline can do towards the formation of an army. I say humiliation, because, the well organized bands of a despot, (like the British troops in Canada,) can by skilful dispositions and unity of effort, always defeat numbers, vastly superior, of men animated by the purest patriotism that ever warmed or ennobled the heart, but unassisted by a practical acquaintance with war.

But we have good authority for saying “the battle is not to the strong.” The best corps of British soldiers sent into America, have been defeated by Patriots, half armed and but indifferently organized. The host of the Sennacherib prevailed not against Jerusalem; and the almost countless numbers led into Greece by the despot of Persia, were routed on the plains of Marathon. The chosen bands of Great Britain were met at Saratoga by the yeomanry of America, who were uninstructed in the art of war, and they were conquered—and may not the yeomanry of the Canadas do as much? That they will, is to be expected; and that they may finally succeed in bursting the galling bands of political slavery, cannot be doubted:

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" For freedom's battle once begun,
Sent down from bleeding sire to son,
Though often lost, is ever won."

If it be excepted by you, that the course of the present administration of our government has been against the interests of your country—I answer that we have treaty stipulations with Great Britain which it is proper for our government to preserve until it is agreed by the whole nation, that they shall be disregarded; and if you charge any officer of our government with having taken steps against your people, and those of our citizens who desired to give you aid, which was uncalled for by our treaty obligations, you will understand that there was no approval given for those acts by the democratic part of our people—that plaudits for those acts alone came from the British Whig party, whose organs in this country, sung praises in tenor and treble, while they were responded to in base by the Toronto Patriot and the Montreal Herald.

Be not deceived! The cause of your country can never find support with the British Whigs of this. Be not disheartened! But let the proper time come, and come it will, for the people of the Canadas to make the effort for a political existence, and they will then find themselves liberally succored and assisted by the democracy of America. We have hearts enough willing and hands ready. The cause, is not the cause of your country alone—but of ours and of all mankind. It is the cause of free government, of religion, and of God.

I have written this letter as an appeal to your good sense; and for the purpose of bringing before your mind some of the features of the British Whig party of this country, which may possibly have escaped your attention: and I would have you be assured that I have done so with no other feelings towards you, than those of respect and esteem. My only desire is to be instrumental in the extension of free democratic institutions to all the people, and to every part of the American Continent—and so far as in me lies, to assist in maintaining them, unimpaired, in the land of my birth, where they have been bestowed, and where my forefathers assisted in establishing the first altar of Liberty.

Sir, I am,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

TH: J. SUTHERLAND.

LETTER No. II.

New-York, June 15, 1840.

To Dr. WOLFRED NELSON,

Late of Lower Canada, now of Plattsburgh, N. Y. :

DEAR SIR—The deep solicitude I feel that the democratic institutions of this country, the land of my birth, should be perpetuated and preserved, unimpaired, and be handed down from this generation to the next, as they were given to us by our forefathers—with the hope, which I entertain, soon to see the benefits of similar institutions extended to the people of the Canadas, has prompted me to address you once more on a subject which I deem of the highest moment at this time, to every lover of liberty and the equal rights of man.

It cannot be doubted that so long as Great Britain rests her spreading and inordinate dimensions upon her conquests, and her colonies—just so long the people of that nation will be made to submit to the sway and government of a moneyed aristocracy ; and whether they, who exercise the government, are called *Whigs* or *Tories*, they will be aristocrats—or call them if you please, *Radicals* or *Reformers*, they will be aristocrats still, with all their usual characteristics of—cash and corruption. As in Great Britain the moneyed power and the government is in firm alliance to *oppose the people*, and thereby to sustain the power of the one and the wealth of the other—so whatever influence the British aristocrats may have with the citizens of this republic, you will find it in all cases operating against the principles of democracy, and openly opposing every measure which may seem to be calculated to favor the establishment of democratic institutions in the Canadas.

When the great charter of our rights was adopted in this country by our patriot sires—when our political freedom was established, and our independence was acknowledged, the enemies of civil liberty and equal rights were not made friends to free institutions. The British aristocracy are as little in love with our democratic form of government at this time, as they were at the moment they were struggling to put down and to smother the spirit of patriotism and of liberty which burst forth at Lex-

ington and Bunker Hill: and may not the British aristocrats reasonably be supposed as ready now to destroy the democracy of our country as they were then to oppose its establishment? British influence is as deadly hostile, at this time, to the existence of democratic institutions in America as were their mercenary bands of soldiers who were brought against our forefathers during their revolutionary struggle by their Gages, their Howes, their Tarletons, their Rawdons, and their Burgoynes and Cornwallises, and require as much vigilance on our part to be resisted.

The influence which the British aristocracy may have in this country almost entirely depends upon the state of the commercial intercourse between the two countries. This intercourse has been for a series of years past decidedly to the advantage of the British, and to the injury and almost to the ruin of our country. Therefore, any measure of our government which may tend to deprive the British of this advantage in trade, will not only confer pecuniary benefits on our people, but it will prove alike a measure for sustaining and extending the principles and institutions of democracy.

By reviewing the records of the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain, we shall find that there has been, for many years, an annual importation of British manufactures into this country, amounting in value to more than \$90,000,000, while the exportations from the United States to that country amount in value to barely \$60,000,000. Hence it appears the British have an advantage in their trade with us, annually, to the amount of \$30,000,000; and from this has come the result that *our country is drained of specie—our people are in debt—our manufacturers are ruined—and British goods have taken the place of those of every kind, which should have been produced by our own hands*—and thus it is, our people walk upon British carpets, sleep under British blankets, eat upon British porcelain with British knives and forks, drink their wine, ("gin-cocktails" or "hard-cider!") from British cut glass, and parade their persons in the streets and public places, shining in British cloths and British finery; and while it so exists we may rest assured that our people, more or less, will imbibe British principles, which will have the effect to array them against any measures for the liberation of your country, in which you might desire aid and assistance from us.

To counteract these evils is one of the prominent measures of the Democratic party. To perpetuate them would be the result of the measures proposed and advocated by the British whigs of this country.

A prominent measure of the party who have put General Har-

rison in nomination for the Presidency, is a high tariff, which they advocate as a protection to the American manufacturer. But a more idle scheme for the purposes of protection, could not possibly be conceived by wise and learned statesmen. Allow Great Britain to have gold and silver for a circulating medium in her own country, while we have a paper currency, *which she prescribes for us*, and no duties that we could impose on her manufactures would exclude them from our country, or protect our own in the least. For whatever may be exacted on British goods, in the way of duties, would come out of the pockets of the consumer in this country, if the present policy of our commercial intercourse be continued—which is thus:

Of her manufactures, Great Britain exports to the United States, to the value of \$90,000,000 annually. For \$60,000,000 of this amount, she takes her pay in the produce of our country, leaving \$30,000,000 to be paid in bullion, or otherwise. Now, we have no mines by the coinage from which we are able to afford an annual amount of *thirty millions of dollars* to pay for British goods—which our people do not want. But, after taking from our country all the specie they can glean, to make up for the deficit, the British take the stocks of our *nine hundred banks*, which they have, by their friends and agents in the United States, procured to be created *for the express purpose of paying themselves for their own manufactures*; and whenever bank stock has failed to be procured in quantities sufficient for the purpose, *state bonds* have been made to meet the demand; in the creation of which the British have been no less indirectly concerned. We have imposed duties on their goods, and the consumers have paid it, and British manufactures have continued to flood the country—while new creations of bank stock, and an increase of bank bills, with the consequent rise in the price of labor and of every kind of property, has enabled the British manufacturer to obtain undiminished prices for his fabrics. Nor have the British been compelled even to afford the amount of the duties imposed on their goods from the specie which their agents have gathered in our country, for while they have lugged the gold and silver from our shores, they have been permitted to pay the duties *a worthless bank paper*, on which there were but *promises to pay*—that which the institutions had not in their vaults to give.

What has most facilitated the British in palming their manufactures upon us, is the disposition which has been made of the duties when paid in. These moneys have been put into the possession of the banks, and this has enabled them to double their issues, and thus to expand the currency, and blow up the bubble of speculation, while the British have poured into our country their manufactures with good round profits; making the ta-

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riff, which was said to have been put on for the purpose of their obstruction, afford the very means of bringing their goods into the country at an increased advantage; and such is the condition of the commercial intercourse between the two countries which it is the avowed policy of the British Whig party in the United States to continue.(1.)

These operations, so ruinous in their effect, not only upon the currency and business of the country, but upon our political and social condition, are now, however, in part frustrated and broken up. The public treasures of the nation have been withdrawn from the United States Bank, (an institution most deadly hostile in its character to the principles of free government, which is now wasting, slowly, what is left of its once bloated, but now poor, lean and shrunk form, that will soon pass, "unhonored and unsung;") and by a recent enactment of our Congress they are no longer to be given to the keeping of irresponsible bankers; but the moneys hereafter collected from the people for the support of government are to be kept in the hands of the people's servants, to be paid out and used only for the purposes for which they are levied; and the duties on British and

(1.) Extract from a letter received very recently, by a commercial gentleman in New-York, from another in England.

"Manchester, England, July 22, 1840.

"Our business continues extremely dull—and I see little prospect of immediate improvement. Our market with America, is in a measure cut off, and if your Mobocratic or Democratic, (as it is called) Administration, succeed in carrying out their vile measures of reforming the currency, we may expect to lose our foothold in the United States, almost entirely.

"I see your papers speak with much confidence of the success of Gen. Harrison to the Presidency office. I don't know who he is, but hope he may be elected, for if the *Aristocracy* in America do not succeed now, they may expect to be ruled by the farming and laboring classes forever. I know very well that your currency has been as bad as any thing could well be, for your country, and was well calculated to inflate prices to an unnatural extent, but you see, as long as that was the case, you could send no produce or manufactures abroad, because prices were lower every where else, than they were with you. and WE could supply all other markets, and send any amount to your country, and undersell you in every thing and take back gold in return, which is not wanted as long as your banks can create a paper currency of their own; so you see all your banking interests are benefited, your aristocracy and rich men receive great dividends, the laboring classes, as long as they can get enough to eat and drink ought to be satisfied, while we have the entire control of your vast country; but let that demagogue Martin Van Buren succeed, the banks lose their immense power, the rich and high born will lose their proper influence, by giving a more equal chance to the low herd; your produce growers and manufacturers will be able to beard US in our own den, while the market that we have had in your country, we shall be cut entirely off from."

other foreign manufactures are hereafter to be paid in gold and silver, the legal currency of our country; and bank bills, therefore, will no longer afford a passport for British goods to the United States.

This, sir, is regarded, by every true democrat, as the beginning of a glorious reform; and if the triumph of the Democratic party, who have thus commenced it, at the coming election, shall allow them to carry it out, happy indeed will it be for this country; and, then, if British agents here are allowed to create no more bank stock, or state bonds—our currency will at least acquire a broader specie basis—no more of British manufactures will be sent into our country than our own products will be accepted for in payment—and then our own manufacturers may create their fabrics, and sell them for a profit, in defiance of the competition of the British with their pauper labor—and they will find that protection for their own manufactures in the “specie system” which the “American system,” or “high tariff system” could not give; and in the end our country will be rid of British goods and British influences.

On the other hand, should the British Whig party succeed in placing themselves in power by means of the deceptions they are now practising upon the people, what evils to our country may we not expect. Pandora's box will then be opened! Our country will continue to be flooded with British manufactures, and American manufactories will be closed. Gold and silver will no longer form even a part of our circulating medium—the specie here will be carried off and its place supplied by a flood of paper money, which will pervade the country and the whirlwind of speculation will continue to rage. Another national bank will be created, into the gorging stomach of which will be thrown the money of the people. Its stock passes, either directly or indirectly into the hands of British capitalists—and it becomes allied to the great central moneyed power in London—and Great Britain through this medium will then as effectually control the business and destinies of this country as she would if we were again colonies of her crown. Let this but happen and you and your friends may cease talking of a revolution in the Canadas. The difference of the condition of your country, and what ours would be then, would not be worth fighting for! While you would be left without a hope for your country, we should have remaining but the privilege of contemplating what we might have been, if we had not suffered our glorious inheritance, which was bequeathed to us by our forefathers, and which cost them such a vast amount of toil, of suffering, of blood and of treasure, bartered away.

Should the British Whig party get into power, a high tariff, no

doubt, will be levied on British manufactures imported into this country, under the specious pretext of protecting American manufactures. But the surplus revenue thereby created *would be used by the agents of the British themselves to increase the issues of bank paper*, and consequently to keep up an exorbitant price on every species of property—and thus enable the British manufacturers to send still more of their goods into our country—and to obtain still better prices. The American manufacturers would receive no protection whatever, but on the contrary be forbid to attempt a competition with the British manufacturers—for although they might be enabled to get a greater price for their fabrics, than they could if it were otherwise, yet the increased price of labor and of the articles which they must necessarily consume, would throw the advantage entirely on the side of the British manufacturers with their pauper laborers; and the only gainers by this in our country would be the rich bank speculator—while all the laboring classes, who are the principal consumers, would be greatly the losers.

From the moment of the commencement of our revolutionary struggle up to the present date, the British government has had its friends among the people of this country; and since the days of our republican forefathers, there has grown up in our land a moneyed aristocracy of great strength, and alien to the interest of the laboring class of our fellow-citizens, making every thing of the nobility of wealth, and little or nothing of intellectual or moral worth; aiming to control the currency, capital, and trade of the country, and boldly aspiring by the most corrupt appliances, to legislative and governmental control. This power is every where awake; and it is the ever ready agent of the British aristocracy in this country.

I have now, sir, but to ask, if you are willing to be found giving aid to put the power of our government into the hands of this moneyed aristocracy, who are so deadly hostile to liberty and equality? That these moneyed aristocrats are so hostile, we have from a knowledge of the principles of their leading men—from their open opposition to the measures and principles of democracy and their adherence to British influence and British interest; and from the sentiments of the newspapers they support.

Sir, I am,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

TH: J. SUTHERLAND.

LETTER No. III.

New-York, June 23, 1840.

To Dr. WOLFRED NELSON,

Late of Lower Canada, now of Plattsburgh, N. Y. :

DEAR SIR—I penned my letter of the 15th inst. with the view to make that my last communication to you through the public prints. But, sir, while looking over the gross frauds which are daily and indefatigably being resorted to by the British Whig party, (in their present game for power,) to deceive the people—and, now, beholding their leaders endeavoring to combine the rich, by assuring to them the creation of new facilities to increase their already overgrown store, at the expense of the laboring man—to attach the poor with the devices of log cabins, and the promise of high prices for services, and goods at low rate—to bring in the religious, by kissing their hands to the church—to gather the dissolute, by dealing out to them potations of hard cider—to entice the young and vain, by bringing *women* and *girls* to their political meetings, and to participate in their *processions* and *spectacles*—and to draw the friends of your country to their course, by whispering to their ears a hypocritical profession of patriotism and love of liberty, in order to procure the united support of all these, for the candidate they have put in nomination for the office of chief magistrate of these United States—a man with nothing but a factitious character—the mere popinjay of the party by whom he has been brought forward, I could but feel myself justified in addressing you again on a subject to which you cannot, at least, be indifferent.

In the nomination of General Harrison as a candidate for the office of President of the United States, by the British Whig party, "*superior or splendid talents* were not considered." So says their State Central Committee. "But," say they who have put him in nomination, "we can make a glorious rally *under his banner* and reach the hearts of the people by *his services*." Therefore, you will perceive, sir, it is evident that they thought to obtain for him more consideration for his *past services*, than for his talents and capacity *now to serve the people* in the office for which they propose him.

According to my understanding there is no citizen of the United States who can establish for himself claims to one office, by any services which he may render his country in another. If the people confer upon a citizen an office which he accepts, and he performs its duties faithfully, according to the best of his abilities, he has done no more than was obligatory upon him; and when he has received the salary or fees annexed to the office, he has got all which he has a right to demand of the people in consideration of his services. Our citizens select from among themselves, individuals to fill the offices of government on account of their supposed capacity to serve them in such offices—and they do not give their public offices to any as a reward for *past services*, however faithfully and efficiently those services may have been performed.

Nevertheless, I would not be understood to say, that when a citizen has periled his life in the defence of his country, or otherwise served it in a faithful and efficient manner, he has not entitled himself to the esteem of his fellow-citizens; and God forbid that I should be found laboring to tarnish any honestly acquired fame, or to destroy the esteem which such person may have obtained with the people of this country. But, whenever a citizen lays claims to merit, for his services, which is not his due, and allows himself to be put up as a candidate for the highest office in the gift of the people, and asks for their suffrages on account of his *services*, then the services of such citizen become a proper subject for public inquiry, and his claim to honor and merit is made a matter for the consideration of the people.

If the claims of General Harrison for the suffrages of the American people, are alone based upon the *merit of his past services*, (which are only in a rightful manner to be considered as affording evidence of his capacity and abilities for future services,) then, certainly, the nature and character of his services may be inquired into, by any citizen, without being justly subjected to the charge of attempting to detract from any merit which does really belong to him, and if upon a fair examination of those performances, in which General Harrison claims to have rendered services to his country, it is shown that he has exhibited a want of capacity to perform, efficiently, the duties of any office with which he may have been entrusted, however correct his *intentions* might have been, it is a good objection to him now, and a sufficient reason why he should not at the coming election receive the votes of the people of the United States for the highest office within their gift.

To attempt to form any just opinion of the movements and operations of an army, or of the talents and capacity of its commander, from those accounts which float along upon the public

voice, and which are picked up and catered, by the conductors of newspapers, to feed the public curiosity, would be extremely idle. Individuals not connected with an army, are allowed to obtain but very little correct information of its movements and operations; and the only information worthy to be relied upon, is that which comes from persons holding military stations with the force—and from the reports of the commanding officer. These last constitute, by far, the best and most certain information, upon which to found an estimation of the conduct and character of such officer.

In the report of the proceedings of the Congress of the United States on the 17th day of December, 1811, there appears a copy of a letter over the name of General Harrison, bearing date at Vincennes, 18th of Nov. 1811, giving a detailed account of the "Battle of the Wabash" or Tippecanoe; which letter was addressed by General Harrison to the Hon. William Eustis, then Secretary of War, and was communicated by President Madison to the House of Representatives. The letter being thus communicated, and appearing with the published proceedings of Congress, puts its authenticity beyond a doubt, but if there was any thing more wanting to establish its genuineness we have it in the declaration of General Harrison himself—"that no honest man would suffer his friends to publish documents in his name which were not genuine, and which he was not then willing to endorse." Wherefore, it will be conceded, that this account of the Battle of Tippecanoe, may be taken as coming from General Harrison himself, and just as it would now be endorsed by him.

By referring to the accounts given of the occurrences of those times, it appears that in the summer and autumn of 1811, the Indian tribes located along the borders of our Western Territories had assumed attitudes of hostility towards our frontier settlers, instigated, as it was supposed, by agents of the British Government, who were then even more hostile to our people than the savages themselves. "In the year 1810," (says the *National Intelligencer*, of September, 1811,) "a Miami Chief having received at Fort Malden his usual donation of goods, was thus addressed by Ellicott, the British Agent: 'My son, keep your eyes fixed on me—my tomahawk is up—be you ready—but do not strike until I give you the signal!' and every account," (continues the *Intelligencer*,) "we receive from that country confirms the belief, that British agents among the Indians excite them against us, and furnish them with muskets, powder, ball, provisions," &c.

A great bell had then lately been sent around among the different tribes for the purpose of forming a confederacy of the Indians, in order, as our government was currently advised, "to

confine the great waters and prevent it from overflowing them;" and a chief of the Shawanese, the Prophet, had collected a small body of Indian warriors at his town on the northerly side of the Wabash, near the junction of the Tippecanoe with that river, consisting, principally, of the members of his own tribe, but reinforced by a few warriors from the neighboring tribes, with a view, as it was supposed, to make an attack upon the people of the frontiers of Indiana.

Advised of these proceedings on the part of the Indians, the President of the United States issued his order to General Harrison, then Governor of the Territory of Indiana, directing him to take command of the forces of the United States stationed in the territory, consisting of the fourth regiment of infantry, and one company of the 7th regiment, under the command of Colonel Boyd, a small detachment of dragoons, and a fraction of a company of riflemen, and after reinforcing them with detachments of mounted riflemen and Indiana militia, which were ordered out for that purpose, to march upon the Prophet with such force, and to chastise him for his insolence, if he could not awe him into subjection. The troops for the expedition having been concentrated at Vincennes, then the seat of government of the territory, from thence, or from Fort Harrison, about sixty miles above, General Harrison took up his line of march, sometime about the beginning of November. On the second or third day of the same month, he arrived with his forces at Vermillion river, on the northerly side of the Wabash, where he erected a block house, for the protection of his boats, which he was there obliged to leave, and as a depository for his heavy baggage and such part of his provisions as he was unable to transport in wagons.

"On the morning of the 3d instant," says General Harrison, in his account of the battle of Tippecanoe, "I commenced my march from the block house. The Wabash above this, turning considerably to the eastward. I was obliged, in order to avoid the broken and woody coverts, which border upon it, to change my course westward of north, to gain the prairies which lie to the back of those woods. At the end of one day's march, I was enabled to take the proper direction, (N. E.) which brought me on the evening of the 5th, to a small creek at about eleven miles from the Prophet's town. I had on the preceding day, avoided the dangerous pass of Pine creek, by inclining a few miles to the left, where the troops and wagons were crossed with expedition and safety. Our route on the 6th, for about six miles, lay through prairies separated by small points of wood."

As the American forces approached within four or five miles of the Prophet's town, understanding that the remaining part of the route was through an open wood, and the probability being greater that they should be attacked in front than on either flank, General Harrison caused his troops to halt, and *formed them in order of battle*, in manner which he thus describes:

"The United States infantry placed in the centre, with two companies of militia infantry, and one of mounted riflemen on each flank, formed the front line. In the rear of this line, was placed the baggage, drawn up as compactly as possible, and immediately behind it, a RESERVE of three companies of militia infantry. The cavalry formed a second line, at the distance of three hundred yards in the rear of the front line, and a company of mounted riflemen, the advance guard at that distance in front. To facilitate the march, the whole were then broken off into short columns of companies, a situation more favorable for forming in order of battle with facility and precision."

This order of battle proposed by General Harrison, forms no very important item in the matters presented for the estimation of his character as a military chieftain, as the formation was put to no test by him; and then the propriety of such a disposition of his force to receive an attack, depended more upon the character of the troops he commanded, for discipline, than the class or corps to which they belonged; but, if his regulars were in that state of discipline which such troops may be supposed to possess, and his militia men were like those we have usually seen, composed of farmers, mechanics and professional men, assembled at the moment from their various avocations of life, and entirely ignorant of the art of war, then his proposed order of battle was extremely exceptionable.

"In the formation of my troops," says General Harrison, "I used a single rank, or what is termed an Indian file—because in Indian warfare, where there is no shock to resist, one rank is nearly as good as two; and in that kind of warfare, the extension of line is matter of the first importance."

Assuming this to be correct, there would have been great error in his disposing of his whole regular infantry in the front line, where, in case of an attack, they would be compelled to do the whole of the fighting, though there was no shock to be met which should particularly require the regular troops to resist. The history of all our wars exhibit the fact that the best, and the almost only service obtained from recent levies of raw militia in field engagements, is at the onset. The militia when once broken, are seldom rallied again, and if rallied at all, it is only by the greatest exertions; whereas, regular disciplined troops, when broken, are, on most occasions, rallied with facility. So, when the militia, or those troops upon which the dependence is the least, are placed in the front line of the army, if they are broken, none are disappointed; and the regular force being in the second line, and remaining firm to meet the pursuing enemy, produce a shock which cannot fail to be greatly felt by the pursuers, if it does not overwhelm them. But, if otherwise, the regular, or best troops of the army are placed in the front line, and made to begin the battle, it is difficult afterwards to bring forward any mili-

tia force to take a part in the fight. Having stood by to see blood flow for the first time, militiamen are not, then, readily brought into a battle—and the regulars are left to finish, as well as begin, the work of the engagement; and whenever the regulars, upon whom is placed the dependence of the army, are broken, the militia are at once struck with a panic, and a defeat and general rout is the result.

From this I infer General Harrison to have been in *error*, in proposing to place *the whole of his regular force of infantry in his front line*. A portion of the regulars, at least, should have been formed in a second line. Had he met an attack, with his forces drawn up in the order he proposed, and his first line had been broken, his "reserve of three companies of militia infantry" would have proved of but small account.(1.)

(1.) The following extract from history, will show that these exceptions are not captious, nor without support from military authorities.

"Soon after taking command of the Southern army, General Greene despatched General Morgan, with four hundred continentals under Col. Howard, Col. Washington's corps of dragoons, and a few militia, amounting in all to about six hundred, to take a position on the left of the British army, then lying at Winnsborough, under Lord Cornwallis, while he took post about seventy miles to his right. This judicious disposition, excited his Lordship's apprehensions for the safety of Ninety-Six and Augusta, British posts, which he considered as menaced by the movements of Morgan.

"Colonel Tarleton, with a strong detachment, amounting in horse and foot, to near a thousand men, was immediately despatched by Cornwallis, to the protection of Ninety-Six, with orders to bring General Morgan to battle if possible. To the ardent temper and chivalrous disposition of the British Colonel, this direction was perfectly congenial. Greatly superior in numbers, he advanced on Morgan with a menacing aspect, and compelled him at first to fall back rapidly. But the retreat of the American commander was not long continued. Irritated by pursuit, reinforced by a body of militia, and reposing great confidence in the spirit and firmness of his regular troops, he halted at the Cowpens, and determined to gratify his adversary in his eagerness for combat. This was on the night of the 16th of January, 1781. Early in the morning of the succeeding day, Tarleton being apprised of the situation of Morgan, pressed towards him with redoubled rapidity, lest by renewing his retreat, he should again elude him.

"But Morgan now had other thoughts than those of flight. Already had he for several days been at war with himself, in relation to his conduct. Glorifying in action, his spirit recoiled from the humiliation of retreat, and his resentment was roused by the insolence of pursuit. This mental conflict becoming more intolerable to him than disaster or death, his courage triumphed perhaps over his prudence, and he resolved upon putting every thing to the hazard of the sword.

"By military men who have studied the subject, his disposition of battle is said to have been masterly. Two light parties of militia were advanced in front, with orders to feel the enemy as they approached; and preserving a desultory well-aimed fire, as they fell back to the front line,

The army proceeded on towards the Prophet's Town.

"Our march," says General Harrison, "was slow and cautious, and much delayed by the examination of every place which seemed calculated for an ambushade. Indeed the ground was for some time so unfavorable, that I was obliged to change the position of the several corps, three times

to range with it, and renew the conflict. The main body of the militia composed this line, with General Pickens at its head. At a suitable distance in the rear of the first line, a second was stationed, composed of the continental infantry, and two companies of Virginia militia, commanded by Colonel Howard. Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia, armed with sabres, were held in reserve.

"Posting himself, then, in the line of the regulars, he waited in silence the advance of the enemy.

"Tarleton, coming in sight, hastily formed his disposition for battle, and commenced the assault. Of this conduct, the following picture is from the pen of General Lee :

"The American light parties quickly yielded, fell back and arrayed with Pickens. The enemy, shouting, rushed forward upon the front line, which retained its station, and poured in a close fire; but continuing to advance with the bayonet on our militia, they retired, and gained with haste the second line. Here, with part of the corps, Pickens took post on Howard's right, and the rest fled to their horses, probably with orders to remove them to a farther distance. Tarleton pushed forward, and was received by his adversary with unshaken firmness. The contest became obstinate; and each party, animated by the example of its leader, nobly contended for victory. Our line maintained itself so firmly, as to oblige the enemy to order up his reserve. The advance of McArthur reanimated the British line, which again moved forward, and outstretching our front, endangered Colonel Howard's right. This officer instantly took measures to defend his flank, by directing his right company to change its front; but mistaking this order, the company fell back, upon which the line began to retire, and General Morgan directed it to retreat to the cavalry. This manœuvre being performed with precision, our flank became relieved, and the new position was assumed with promptitude. Considering this retrograde movement the precursor of flight, the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder, but as it drew near, Howard faced about, and gave it a close and murderous fire. Stunned by this unexpected shock, the most advanced of the enemy, recoiled in confusion. Howard seized the happy moment, and followed his advantage with the bayonet. This decisive step gave us the day. The reserve having been brought near the line, shared in the destruction of our fire, and presented no rallying point to the fugitives. A part of the enemy's cavalry, having gained our rear, fell on that portion of the militia who had retired to their horses. Washington struck at them with his dragoons, and drove them before him. Thus by a simultaneous effort, the infantry and cavalry of the enemy were routed. Morgan pressed home his success, and the pursuit became vigorous and general.

"In this decisive battle, we lost about seventy men, of whom, twelve only were killed. The British infantry, with the exception of the baggage guard, were nearly all killed or taken. One hundred, including ten officers, were killed; twenty-three officers and five hundred privates, were taken. The artillery, 800 muskets, two standards, thirty-five baggage wagons, and one hundred dragoon horses, fell into our possession."

at the distance of a mile. At half past two o'clock, we passed a small creek at the distance of one mile and a half from the town, and entered an open wood, where the army was halted, and again drawn up in order of battle."

This precautionary course, so just and proper to secure himself against ambuscade or surprise, pursued by General Harrison in his approach upon the Indians, renders still more strange and unaccountable, his extraordinary remissness after his arrival at the Prophet's Town. A natural weakness must, indeed, be attendant upon the mind of that man who could exhibit at one time so much praiseworthy vigilance, and at the next moment, (with evidences crowding upon him of the dangers by which he was surrounded, and the necessity for continued vigilance,) be found disregarding all proper precaution, and thereby afford evidences of such a want of ordinary perception, as did General Harrison, according to his own account of his conduct, on that occasion.

"During the whole of the last day's march," says General Harrison, "*parties of Indians were constantly about us, and every effort was made by the interpreters, to speak to them, but in vain!* New attempts of the kind were now made, but proving equally ineffectual, a Captain Dubois, of the spies and guides, offering to go with a flag to the town, I despatched him with an interpreter to request a conference with the Prophet; in a few moments, a message was sent by Captain Dubois, to inform me that in his attempt to advance, the Indians appeared in both his flanks, and although he had spoken to them in the most friendly manner, they refused to answer, but beckoned him to go forward, and constantly endeavored to cut him off from the army. Upon this information, I recalled the Captain, and determined to encamp for the night, and take some other means for opening a conference with the Prophet. (2.) Whilst I was engaged in tracing

(2.) Burr's life of Harrison, gives the following:

"The Captain started forward with an interpreter, and the army moved slowly after, in order of battle.

"The gallant envoy had not been gone long, before he sent back a messenger, to say that the Indians were around him in considerable numbers, and endeavoring to cut him off from the army; and that they would not listen to the interpreter. The Governor immediately recalled the Captain, and resolving to treat the Indians as enemies, moved on to attack them. He was met directly after by three Indians, one a counsellor of the Prophet. They were sent to show why the army was advancing upon them, and stated that the Prophet wished to avoid hostilities, and had sent a pacific message by the Indians despatched by the Governor from Fort Harrison, but that these men had unfortunately taken the southern route in their return, and thus missed the army."

Then, in an article in the *Tipppecanoe Text-Book*, stated to be an extract from McAffee's *History of the War in the Western country*, it is said:

"Governor Harrison, during this last effort to open a negotiation, which was sufficient to show his wish for an accommodation, resolved no longer to hesitate in treating the Indians as enemies. He, therefore, recalled Captain Dubois, and moved on with a determination to attack them." All these

the lines for the encampment, Major Daviess, who commanded the dragoons, came up to inform me that he had penetrated to the Indian fields—that the ground was entirely open and favorable—that the Indians in front, had manifested nothing but hostility, and had answered every attempt to bring them to a parley, with contempt and insolence. It was immediately advised by all the officers around me, to move forward. A similar wish, indeed, pervaded all the army—it was drawn up in excellent order, and every man appeared eager to decide the contest immediately. Being informed that a good encampment might be had upon the Wabash, I yielded to what appeared the general wish, and directed the troops to advance, taking care, however, to place the interpreters in front, with directions to invite a conference with any Indians they might meet with. We had not advanced above four hundred yards, when I was informed that three Indians had approached the advanced guards, and had expressed a wish to speak to me. I found upon their arrival, that one of them was a man in great estimation with the Prophet. He informed me, *that the chiefs were much surprised at my advancing upon them so rapidly—that they were given to understand by the Delawares and Miamies, whom I had sent to them a few days before, that I would not advance to their town, until I had received an answer to my demands made through them. That this answer had been despatched by the Potawatamie chief, Sagoyewidge, who had accompanied the Miamies and Delawares on their return, that they had left the Prophet's town, two days before, with a design to meet me, but unfortunately taken the road on the south side of the Wabash.* I answered them *that I had no intention of attacking them, until I had discovered that they would not comply with the demands which I had made—that I would go on and encamp at the Wabash, and in the morning would have an interview with the Prophet and his chiefs, and explain to them the determination of the President—that in the mean time, no hostilities should be committed.* He seemed much pleased with this, and promised me that it should be observed on his part. I then resumed my march; we struck the cultivated grounds about five hundred yards below the town, but as they extended to the bank of the Wabash, there was no possibility of getting an encampment which was provided with both wood and water. My guards and interpreters being still with the advanced guards, and taking the direction of the town, THE ARMY FOLLOWED, and advanced within about 150 yards, when about 50 or 60 Indians sallied out, and with loud exclamations, called to the cavalry and to the militia infantry, which were on my right flank, to halt. I immediately advanced to the front, caused the army to halt, and directed an interpreter to request some of the chiefs to come to me. In a few moments, the man who had been with me before, made his appearance. I informed him that my object for the present, was to procure a good piece of ground to encamp on, where we could get wood and water—he informed me that there was a creek to the northwest, which he thought would suit our purpose. I immediately despatched two officers to examine it, and they reported that the situation was excellent. I then took leave of the chief, and a mutual promise was again made for a suspension of hostilities until we could have an interview on the following day."

If "during the wole of the last day's march, parties of Indians were constantly hovering about him," General Harrison was

accounts were either published by General Harrison—or under his personal supervision. Which is the truth? Let his confidential committee answer.

thereby notified, that they were reconnoitering his forces, and that they were keeping a good look out upon his movements; and their hostility was as clearly evidenced by the fact, "*that every effort that was made by the interpreters to speak to them, was but in vain.*" If these circumstances had not satisfied General Harrison, that the Indians were belligerent in their intentions towards him and his army, the fact that they refused to communicate with Capt. Dubois, and attempted to cut him off; and the communication of Major Daviess, "that the Indians in front had manifested nothing but hostility, and answered every attempt to bring them to a parley, with contempt and insolence," ought to have done so—ought to have put him on his guard, and prompted him to the greatest precaution against a surprise—and by efficiency of measures, he ought to have satisfied the Indians of the strength and vigilance of his army. When "every man appeared eager to decide the contest," and the chiefs of the Indians "were much surprised at his advancing upon them so rapidly," was it not then, sir, the time for him to have struck the blow—or, to have put himself in such position as to have been able to destroy the savages at the moment they refused his terms? and should he not have required them to comply instant? Until he "had received an answer to his demands," should he not, I would again inquire, have taken and held possession of their town? If "an answer had been dispatched by Winemac, who had gone down on the south side of the Wabash," the Prophet, notwithstanding, was there, ready to give an immediate answer himself. If the conduct of the Indians had not convinced General Harrison that it was not their intention to comply with his demands, I know not what could have done so. Until he had had an interview, at least with the Prophet himself, his troops should not have laid by their arms. Why delay till morning to demand an answer which had already been made up by the Prophet and sent off with Winemac? What General, (save Harrison,) who had regard for his own life and that of his officers and soldiers, would have allowed sleep to come over them, while they lay within the grasp of a hostile wily Indian foe?

Energy of character and promptitude of action, are among the most essential qualities of an able military chieftain. But, these, without promptitude of decision, which is alone to be found where genius abides, would leave an individual extremely deficient as the commander of an army. Then, sir, I ask you, and every other individual of a discerning mind—and I care not whether they have so much knowledge of military operations as a spinster, to read the account of the battle of Tippecanoe, as given by General Harrison himself, and tell me if he did not, by his own showing, there exhibit a most palpable, and as it proved, a most unfortu-

nate and sinful want of decision. Having once "determined to encamp for the night" on ground of his own choosing, "while he was tracing the lines for the encampment," he was induced to "*yield to what appeared to be the general wish*, and directed the troops to advance." This "*general wish*" as he informs us, was "*to decide the contest immediately*." But, when the enemy sent their messengers to him to express "their surprise at his advancing upon them so rapidly," forsooth! he tells the savages "he had no intention of attacking them—until he had discovered that they would not comply with the demands which he had made"—a matter which they had already fully shown to him by their deportment. Yet, notwithstanding, he suffers "his advanced guards" to be "followed by his army," and "to advance within about twenty-seven rods" of the Prophet's Town—then when he hears the "loud exclamations" of the frightened savages, "he advances to the front and causes his army to halt," and at the request of the terrified Indians, turns off to the left, and *takes up his encampment on ground selected for him by his savage foes!*

"But stop, sir," I fancy you may say, "You are assailing General Harrison's reputation as an officer—and do you not know that his conduct at the Tippecanoe, was approved of by President Madison, and that his military genius and skill has been applauded by General Miller?" That I do, sir, I answer—and I do further know, that the learned Bishop Berkley once wrote a book to prove *that there was no such thing as matter*; and that the Reverend Cotten Mather wrote another book with a view to prove *that there were such creatures as witches!* Notwithstanding, every body still perceives there is matter, and no body now believes in witches.(3.)

(3.) That it may not be said that it is a new thing to question General Harrison's character as a military commander, and that I am among the first to do so, I give the following extract from the *New-York Spectator*, of October 20, 1813, then a leading federal paper, and now one of the first of the British Whig organs of this state, and among the most ardent supporters of General Harrison for the Presidency:

"Harrison was employed, and Ohio militiamen by thousands, and even tens of thousands, placed in his hands. With the aid of the unfortunate Winchester, he delivered one army to death and captivity at the River Raisin; and sacrificed half of another at 'FORT MEIGS.'" "He was besieged in that Fort for months by a few British and Indians; and instead of marching to Malden or retaking Detroit, he always acted on the defensive.

"He called loudly, more than once, for all the militia of Ohio, to save him from the tomahawk of the savage. More than once, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and even the mountains of Virginia, poured forth their motley hosts to his relief and rescue. *Discomfiture, captivity and disgrace*, attended all his movements."

"I found the ground destined for the encampment," says General Harrison, "not altogether such as I could wish it."

Again, by turning to the 5th vol. of Niles' Register, page 172, of the 6th of November, 1813, the following passage will be found:

"At a special meeting of the Common Council of New-York, a motion was made to present Major General Harrison with a sword and the freedom of the city, as the like had been bestowed on Decatur, Perry, &c. But the motion was NEGATIVED: Ayes 5—NOES 12."

Then, here is an extract from the Journals of the Senate of the United States, as reported in Niles' Register, April 13, 1816:

"The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution, directing medals to be struck, and, together with the thanks of Congress, presented to Major General Harrison and Governor Shelby, and for other purposes. After some discussion, Mr. Lacoek moved to amend the resolution, by striking therefrom Major General Harrison. The motion was determined in the affirmative, by the following vote:

"Yeas—Messrs. Gillard, Gore, Hunter, King, Lacoek, Mason, Roberts, Thompson, Jackson, Tait, Turner and Varnum—12.

"Nays—Messrs. Barber, Barry, Condit, Horsey, Macon, Morrow, Ruggles, Talbot, Wells, and Williams—10."

The following opinion of Gen. Harrison's military qualifications, was expressed by the officers of his army, at the time he was in command. They were certainly better judges then, than others can be after the lapse of twenty-five years.

"Grand Camp, Ohio Militia, August 29, 1813.

"Resolved, That after the various requisitions and complicated demands from his Excellency, Major General Harrison, we highly approve of his Excellency, the Governor's conduct on the occasion, and fully coincide with him in the propriety of leaving force sufficient to answer any emergency.

"Resolved, That the conduct of his Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, WILLIAM H. HARRISON, of the North-western Army, on this occasion, is shrouded in mystery, and to us, perfectly inexplicable.

"Resolved, That the foregoing preamble and resolutions be signed by the general and field officers and commandants of independent corps, approving the same in their own and in behalf of their respective commands; and that a copy of the proceedings be delivered by the Secretary to his Excellency the Governor, and a copy to the printer at Franklinton, and each of the printers in Chillicothe, with a request that all the printers in the State would give publicity to the same; also, that the same be signed by the president, and attested by the secretary.

"JAMES MANARY, Brigadier General, President.

"Attest: EZRA OSBURN, Brigade Quartermaster, Secretary.

Robert Lucas, Brig. Gen.

John McDonald, Col.

James Denny, Col.

William Keys, Col.

John Furgison, Col.

Isaac Bonser, Col.

James Kilgore, Major,

John Willet, Major,

Allen Trimble, Major,

N. Beasley, Capt. Com't.

James Wilson, Major,

Prestly Morris, Brig. Major,

John Boggs, Major,

Wm. Rutledge, Brig. Major,

Richard Hoeker, Capt. Com't.

Eden Fennimore, Brig. Q. M.

"WILLIAM KEY BOND, Judge Advocate."

Why, then, in the name of common sense, did he put his army down upon it? The possession of the most ordinary perceptive faculties would have sent him to some other spot. Why was the ground "not altogether such as he could wish it?" To this question, he affords the answer. The ground, he says, "was indeed, admirably calculated for the encampment of regular troops that were opposed to regulars—but it afforded great facility to the approach of savages!" Were his troops opposed to regulars—or were there any in the country from whom he might fear an attack? No—not one! But there was an Indian foe whom he had marched out to subdue, and whose approach, under the cover of night, he had reason to fear. Yet, (as we have it in his own account of his conduct,) within an enemy's territory, and that enemy savages, "who had manifested nothing but hostility," he encamped his men, and suffered them to sleep on ground pointed out for him by the enemy, and which he also knew "*afforded great facilities to the approach of savages.*"

General Harrison states that he followed the practice of General Wayne, in the formation of the columns of his army, and it would seem that there were much more which he might have copied to advantage from the conduct of the old hero of the Indian wars. Had General Harrison remembered the lessons of military instruction which were communicated to him by General Wayne, he had not applied to his enemy to point out to him the ground on which he was to encamp his army. For it is well known to have been the principle and practice of Wayne, not to let his adversary know where his men were encamped for the night.

"It was a piece of dry oak land," says General Harrison, "*rising about ten feet above the level of the marshy prairie in front, (towards the Indian town,) and nearly twice that height, above a similar prairie in the rear, through which, and near to this bank ran a small stream clothed with willows, and other brushwood.* Towards the left flank, this bench of high land widened considerably, but became gradually narrower in the opposite direction, and at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards from the right flank, terminated in an abrupt point. *The two columns of infantry, occupied the front and rear of this ground, at the distance of about one hundred and fifty yards from each other on the left, and something*

Gen. Miller, who lately wrote a letter to the Hon. Mr. Webster bolstering up Gen. Harrison's military character, told a different story at Hancock, N. H., where the people gave him a public dinner, *directly after the war.* In his speech on that occasion, Gen. Miller, after complimenting most of the prominent officers of the army, said, "**as for General Harrison, he should not speak of him as HE DID NOT CONSIDER HIM AS POSSESSING EITHER THE COURAGE OR ABILITIES NECESSARY TO MAKE A GOOD OFFICER.**" This can be proved by unimpeachable evidence, if Gen. Miller or his friends deny it.—*Bost. Post.*

more than half that distance on the right flank—these flanks were filled up, the first, by *two companies of mounted riflemen*, amounting to about one hundred and twenty men, under the command of Major General Wells of the Kentucky militia, who served as Major; the other by *Spencer's company of mounted riflemen*, which amounted to eighty men. The front line was composed of one battalion of United States infantry, under command of Major Floyd, flanked on the right by *two companies of militia*, and on the left by one company. The rear line was composed of a battalion of United States troops, under the command of Captain Baen, acting as Major, and *four companies of militia infantry*, under Lieutenant Colonel Decker. The regular troops of the line joined the mounted riflemen, under General Wells on the left flank; and Colonel Decker's battalion formed an angle with Spencer's company on the left. [right.] (4.)

"*Two troops of dragoons*, amounting to, in the aggregate, about sixty men, were encamped in the rear of the left flank, and *Captain Parke's troop*, which was larger than the other two, in the rear of the front line. Our order of encampment varied little from that above described, excepting when some peculiarity of the ground made it necessary. For a night attack, the order of encampment, was the order of battle, and each man slept immediately opposite to his post in the line. It was my constant custom, to assemble all the field officers, at my tent every evening, by signal—to give them the watch-word and their instructions for the night—those given the night of the *sixth*, were that each corps which formed a part of the exterior line of the encampment, should hold its own ground until relieved. The dragoons were directed to parade, dismounted, in case of a night attack, with their pistols in their belts, and to act as a corps de reserve. The camp was defended by two captain's guards, consisting each of four non-commissioned officers and forty-two privates, and two subaltern's guards of twenty non-commissioned officers and privates. The whole under the command of a field officer of the day."

(4.) In the *Tippecanoe Text-Book*, page 10 and 11, appears an extract from McAfee's history, with a certificate of Waller Taylor, who was aid to General Harrison, certifying that the same is entirely correct, as it relates to the situation of the ground upon which Harrison encamped his army. Mr. Taylor in his certificate, says—"the spot was selected by himself and one Clark, who acted as Brigade Major to Colonel Boyd;" and he declares "that no intimation was given by the Indians of their wish that the Americans should encamp there." Mr. Walter Clark also further certifies—"that he did not go to the *Wabash above the town*—but that it has ever been his belief [strong testimony!] that the position General Harrison's army occupied, was the best that could be found any where near them; and that he believed that nine-tenths of the officers were of that opinion;" and "J. Snelling, Lieutenant Colonel of the 6th infantry," gives his certificate also, "that in his opinion, the ground on which the army encamped, combined the advantage of wood and water, and a defensible position in a greater degree than any other spot in that section of the country."

These certificates were made to sustain General Harrison's character, as a military chieftain. But the only force I can discover in them, is to contradict General Harrison. If he has written truly, then their certificates pass for nothing. Further, if General Harrison *trusted no Colonel or other officer*, as he has himself stated, the certificates of his subordinates are without credit.

Such was the disposition made by Gen. Harrison of his forces, on the ill-fated evening of the 6th of November, 1811, when his people lay down to sleep, to be awakened by "the yells of the savages,"—and many were aroused but to meet the Indians at the door of their tents, and to have their brains knocked out with their murderous tomahawks. "The camp was defended by two captain's guards, consisting each of four non-commissioned officers and forty-two privates and two subaltern's guards of twenty non-commissioned officers and privates." This forms an aggregate of 112 officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. Deducting for the officers and non-commissioned officers twelve, the guards are shown to have embraced one hundred sentinels, which by appointing one-third, the usual number, to be on duty at a time, would give men for thirty-three posts with single sentinels; and these camp guards were all the protection which was afforded to General Harrison and his sleeping army. *Not a picket did he send out! Not a single out-post did he establish, to watch the movements of the enemy!*

"It may, perhaps, be imagined," says General Harrison, "that some means might have been adopted, to have made a more early discovery of the approach of the enemy to our camp—but," continues he, "if I had employed two-thirds of the army, on out-posts, it would have been ineffectual." Who, ever before, or since, has read or heard of a commander of an army having put himself down within the neighborhood of an enemy, and under his very eye, without sending out a single picket, or establishing an out-post to observe the movements of his adversary? In this, General Harrison's conduct is without a parallel; and what is his excuse? Why, "that if he had used two-thirds of his army for that purpose, it *would have been ineffectual*; that the Indians would have found means to pass between them!" Monstrous! It is but a common circumstance that pickets and out-posts are surprised and cut off and that sentinels are evaded—but what commander, save General Harrison, with the supposition that this might possibly be done, has neglected to establish out-posts, to send out pickets and to post sentinels? In my opinion, if General Harrison had acted with due precaution, even after he had taken up his position on the unfavorable ground, (for him,) which had been pointed out by his enemy, he would have established out-posts in or so near the Prophet's town, as to have been able to watch the movements of the Indians—with pickets sent out in different directions from his camp, taking posts at such places as afforded the best advantage to observe the approach of the savages; and to these he would have added *frequent patrols*. Had he made such precautionary arrangements, (instead of laying himself down to sleep with but a few senti-

nels within his camp,) though they all might possibly have been evaded by the savages, the probability is, that they would not, at least, so far as to have allowed them to surround his whole force, before he was aware of their approach. One would have supposed that the vigilance of the Indians, "who were constantly about him during the whole of the last day's march," observing his movements and his every step, would have admonished General Harrison of the necessity of keeping a look out for them, (if his military genius had not suggested it to his mind,) but it seems it did not.

The whole conduct of General Harrison on that occasion, so unfortunate to our fellow-citizens who served under his command, was highly censurable. Any one who will take the trouble to examine the account published by himself, *will find nothing to commend—but every thing to condemn.* The forces of General Harrison, amounted to very little above *eight hundred non-commissioned officers and privates.* The Prophet's forces, he thinks to have been but a trifle inferior to his own. He is "*convinced they were at least six hundred.*" The Indians had observed all his previous movements, and when they saw him *ensconced* in camp on the extremity of the table of land, just where they desired him, surrounded by marshy prairies and bushes close up to his lines, within which, (as they found, upon reconnoitering,) the whole of his forces were drawn, quiet and sleeping, with not a man outside of the lines of his camp to observe their movements—they, no doubt, thought his people an easy prey—they then looked upon General Harrison and his men, as they did upon the animals that blindly run into their snares—and trusting in the weakness as well as the unwaryness of the Americans, and the advantages which a surprise would afford them, and being emboldened by the near equality of their numbers, *they resolved to make the attack,* which resulted in the killing and wounding of one hundred and eighty-eight of the Americans, among which number fell some of the most valuable and exalted citizens of our country, at the expense of the lives of thirty-six or forty of the Indians—who had been mistaken; for what they supposed the *weakness* of the Americans, was but the *weakness of their General!*

The following is the account given by General Harrison of the proceedings of his forces during the attack :

"The troops were regularly called up an hour before day, and made to continue under arms until it was quite light. On the morning of the 7th I had risen at a quarter after four o'clock, and the signal for calling out the men, would have been given in two minutes, when the attack commenced. *It began on the left flank—but a single gun was fired by the sentinels,* or by the guard in that direction, which made not the least resistance, but abandoned the officer, and fled into camp, *and the first notice which the troops of that flank had of the danger, was from the yells of the*

savages, within a short distance of the line—but even under those circumstances, the men were not wanting to themselves or to the occasion. Such of them as were awake, or were easily awakened, seized their arms and took their stations: others which were more tardy, had to contend with the enemy in the doors of their tents. The storm first fell upon Captain Barton's company of mounted riflemen, which formed the left angle of the rear line. The fire upon these was excessively severe, and they suffered considerably before relief could be brought to them. Some few Indians passed into the encampment near the angle, and one or two penetrated to some distance before they were killed. I believe all the other companies were under arms, and tolerably formed before they were fired on. The morning was dark and cloudy—our fires afforded a partial light, which, if it gave us some opportunity of taking our positions, was still more advantageous to the enemy, affording them the means of taking a surer aim—they were therefore extinguished as soon as possible. Under all these discouraging circumstances, the troops, (nineteen-twentieths of whom had never been in an action before,) behaved in a manner that can never be too much applauded. They took their places without noise, and with less confusion than could have been expected from veterans placed in a similar situation. As soon as I could mount my horse, I rode to the angle that was attacked—I found that Barton's company had suffered severely, and the left of Geiger's entirely broken. I immediately ordered Cook's company, and the late Captain Wentworth's, under Lieutenant Peters, to be brought up from the centre of the rear line, where the ground was much more defensible, and formed across the angle in support of Barton's and Geiger's. My attention was then engaged by a heavy firing from the left of the front line, where were stationed the small company of United States Riflemen, (then, however, armed with muskets,) and the companies of Baen, Snelling, and Prescott, of the 4th regiment. I found Major Daviess forming the Dragoons, in the rear of those companies, and understanding that the heaviest part of the enemy's fire proceeded from some trees about fifteen or twenty paces in front of those companies, I directed the Major to dislodge them with a part of the Dragoons. Unfortunately, the Major's gallantry determined him to execute the order with a smaller force than was sufficient, which enabled the enemy to avoid him in front, and attack his flanks. The Major was mortally wounded, and his party driven back. The Indians were, however, immediately and gallantly dislodged from their advantageous position, by Captain Snelling, at the head of his company. In the course of a few minutes after the commencement of the attack, the fire extended along the LEFT FLANK, the WHOLE OF THE FRONT, the RIGHT FLANK, and PART of the rear line. Upon SPENCER'S MOUNTED RIFLEMEN, and the right of Warwick's company, which was posted on the right of the rear line, it was excessively severe; Captain Spencer and his first and second Lieutenants were killed, and Captain Warwick was mortally wounded—those companies, however, still bravely maintaining their posts, but Spencer's had suffered so severely, and having originally too much ground to occupy, I reinforced them with Robb's company of Riflemen, which had been driven, or by mistake, ordered from their position, on the left flank, towards the centre of the camp, and filled the vacancy that had been occupied by Robb with Prescott's company of the 4th United States Regiment. My great object was to keep the lines entire, to prevent the enemy from breaking into the camp, until day-light, which should enable me to make a general and effectual charge. With this view, I had reinforced every part of the line that had suffered much; and as soon as the approach of

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
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morning discovered itself, I withdrew from the front line Snelling's, Posey's, (under Lieutenant Albright,) and Scott's—and from the rear line, Wilson's companies, and drew them up upon the left flank, and at the same time, I ordered Cook's and Baen's companies, the former from the rear, the latter from the front line, to reinforce the right flank; foreseeing that at these points, the enemy would make their last efforts. Major Wells, who commanded on the left flank, not knowing my intentions precisely, had taken the command of these companies, and charged the enemy, before I had formed the dragoons, with which I meant to support the infantry; a small detachment of these, were, however, ready, and proved amply sufficient for the purpose. The Indians were driven at the point of the bayonet, and the dragoons pursued and forced them into the marsh, where they could not be followed. Captain Cook and Lieutenant Larabee had, agreeably to my order, marched their companies to the right flank, had formed them under the fire of the enemy, and being then joined by the riflemen of that flank, had charged the Indians, killed a number, and put the rest to a precipitate flight. A favorable opportunity was here offered to pursue the enemy with dragoons, but being engaged at that time on the other flank, I did not observe it until it was too late.^(5.)

Such is General Harrison's account of the affair at Tippecanoe—so disgraceful to him, as a military commander—and unfor-

(5.) DIAGRAM OF THE BATTLE OF TIPPECANOE.



1 Prescott, 3 Snelling, 5 Larabee, 7 Hawkins, U. S. inf. commanded by Major Floyd.—2 Brown, 4 Cook, 6 Peters, 8 Barton, U. S. inf. commanded by Captain Baen.—9 Scott, 11 Albright, Indiana militia, commanded by Major Redmond.—10 Warwick, 12 Wilson, 13 Hargrove, 14 Wilkins, commanded by Lieut. Col. Decker.—15 Robb, 16 Geiger, mounted riflemen, commanded by Major Wells.—17 Spencer, mounted riflemen, commanded by Capt. Spencer.—18 —, 19 —, 20 Parke, dragoons, commanded by Major Daviess.

tunate to the brave men whom he commanded. He allowed his army to be placed in a position where they could not act, and to be surprised—and all they could then do, was to keep their lines entire, and the savages from penetrating their camp, until daylight, (as it was stated by General Harrison;) and standing there in their places they could but receive the shot of the enemy, the darkness of night preventing any movement by them; and though they might fire their rifles in the direction of the foe, their shots were but at random—and when the day dawned the Indians were easily routed; the hopes of the savages having been based upon a surprise, and the condition of their unwary adversary—if no charge at all had been made upon them by the Americans, the light of the morning would have dispersed them.

The attack "*began on the left flank*"—and the first notice the troops on that flank had of their danger, was "*from the yells of the savages*," who were then already upon them. "*Such of them*," says General Harrison, "*as were awake, or easily awakened*, seized their arms and took their stations: others which were more tardy, *had to contend with the enemy in the door of their tents*." (6.)

How different would it have been with our people if they had been the attacking party, instead of the Indians? The spirit of Major Daviess might answer the question!

(3.) The *Tippecanoe Text-Book*, says—"They (Gen. H. and his army,) *were not surprised*, as has been asserted; for it will be seen by referring to Niles' Register, vol. II. p. 56, that three captains, one ensign, one surgeon and one assistant surgeon of the 4th United States infantry, have published certificates and statements relative to the battle, in which the prudence and skill of General Harrison are represented in the most honorable light."

Well, now, shall we believe these 3 captains, 1 ensign, 1 surgeon and 1 surgeon's mate—or shall we believe General Harrison, himself? Does he not describe a *surprise* when he says, "*such of them as were awake!*" &c.

Again: in the *Tippecanoe Text-Book*, it will be found, that that very publication, which has been got out by the British Whigs, for the express purpose of patching up General Harrison as a hero, has given us the information "*that three Indians attacked Col. E. Geiger in his tent, at one time—that he killed one, and vanquished the other two, when he was wounded in the arm. That Major Floyd fought like Cæsar in his shirt tail, and clothed himself with victory.*" Is not this, too, a picture of a *surprise*?

Then, again: Burr's life of Harrison, just as plainly gives the lie to the statement of the *Tippecanoe Text-Book*, that General Harrison "*was not surprised.*" It says—"The treacherous Indians had crept up so near the sentries, as to hear them challenge when relieved. They intended to rush upon the sentries and kill them before they could fire; but one of them discovered an Indian creeping toward him in the grass and fired. This was immediately followed by the Indian yell and a desperate charge upon the left flank."

However surprising was General Harrison's whole conduct, there was nothing in it more so, than the fact that he had suffered his camp fires to burn through the night. They afforded by the light they threw out, every facility that could be desired, for the Indians to observe the position of his men, while it was as effectual in secluding the Indians, in their approach, from the observation of his sentinels; and when the attack began, it enabled the Indians to single out his officers, who were readily distinguished by their active movements in arousing and forming the men. That his burning camp fires had such an operation is evidenced by the fact, that there were *seven* officers killed, and *nine* wounded—making a total of *sixteen*, hors du combat, which is full half of the number of the officers that properly belong to eight or nine hundred men, the amount of the forces which General Harrison had under his command; and those who fell were the most gallant and efficient of his army. (7.)

(7.) A general return of the killed and wounded of the army under the command of his Excellency William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Indiana Territory, in the action with the Indians, near Prophet's Town, November 7, 1811.

Killed—One aid-de-camp, one captain, two subalterns, one sergeant, two corporals, thirty privates.

Wounded—since dead—One major, two captains, twenty-two privates.

Wounded—Two lieutenant-colonels, one adjutant, nine sergeants, five corporals, one musician, and one hundred and two privates.

Total killed and wounded—188.

Names of officers killed and wounded, as per general return.

GENERAL STAFF.—*Killed*—Colonel Abraham Owens, aid-de-camp to the Commander-in-chief.

FIELD AND STAFF.—*Wounded*—Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bartholomew, commanding Indiana militia infantry; Lieutenant-Colonel Luke Decker, of do.; Major Joseph H. Daviess, since dead, commanding a squadron of dragoons; Doctor Edward Scull, of the Indiana militia; Adjutant James Hunter, of mounted riflemen.

United States inf. including the late Captain Whitney's rifle company.

Wounded—Captain W. C. Baen, acting major, since dead; Lieutenant George P. Peters; Lieutenant George Gooding; Ensign Henry Burchstead.

Colonel Decker's detachment of Indiana militia.

Wounded—Captain Jacob Warwick, since dead.

Major Redmond's detachment of Indiana militia.

Wounded—Captain John Norris.

Major Well's detachment of mounted riflemen.

Wounded—Captain Frederick Geiger.

Captain Snider's company, including Lieutenant Berry's detachment of mounted riflemen.

Killed—Captain Spier Spencer; First Lieutenant Richard McMahan; Lieutenant Thomas Berry.

NATH. F. ADAMS, Adjutant of the Army.

To his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The battle had begun under what General Harrison, himself, calls "discouraging circumstances." His people were fallen upon in their beds by the savages. The assault commenced on the rear of the left—where the guard fled in "without firing but one single shot." Had an out-post been stationed in the vicinity, it is not to be supposed that they all would have behaved in like manner and fled into camp without firing so as to alarm the whole army before the Indians were upon them. But there were no out-posts. Soon after the attack commenced, as we are informed by General Harrison, "having his attention engaged by a heavy firing from *the left of his front line*," he proceeded in that direction, where he states he found Major Daviess forming the dragoons, "and understanding that the heaviest part of the enemy's fire proceeded from some trees, about fifteen or twenty paces in front, he directed the major to dislodge them with a part of the dragoons." But what part of the dragoons were then formed, or what part of them *he directed* Major Daviess to make the charge with, does not appear. He tells us, however, "that unfortunately the major's *gallantry* determined him to execute the order with a smaller force than was sufficient, which enabled the Indians to avoid him in front, and to attack his flanks—that the major was mortally wounded, and his party driven back." This is, to say the least of it, an ingenious manner, if not an honorable one, for a Commander-in-Chief to account for the failure of a movement made under his own personal direction. Major Daviess was among the dead, when General Harrison drew up his account—and he could not contradict it, however false the statements of his general might be. If I should endeavor to make the account probable, I would suppose that Major Daviess attacked the savages at the moment he was directed to do so by General Harrison, *and with every dragoon who had got his breeches on*, and whom he had then formed—and that he was defeated in his attempt to drive the enemy from their lodgment, from the insufficiency of his force, and the want of support. "The Indians were, however, immediately and gallantly dislodged from their advantageous position by Captain Snelling, at the head of his company," *but it does not appear that Snelling, in making this charge, acted under the direction of General Harrison.*

In a few minutes after the battle commenced, says General Harrison, "the fire extended along *the left flank*, the whole of *the front*, *the right flank*, and *part of the rear line*." This shows him to have been completely surrounded at the moment of the attack; and now I would appeal to you, sir, and to the judgment of every man of sense in the whole country, whether acquainted with military science or not, if this could have been effected by the savages, without having given the alarm to General Harri-

son and his army, had he sent out any reasonable number of pickets and established proper out-posts. The rear angle of the lines on the left had been attacked and broken, the angle on the left in front had been severely attacked, and one of the companies driven in—the rear angle on the right, had been as violently assailed, as well as the company covering the intervening ground between the two lines on the right; and if they were not broken, they had suffered so much, that it had been necessary to reinforce them. Thus was our brave countrymen sorely beset, when—"as the approach of morning discovered itself, General Harrison withdrew from his front and rear line, four companies which he drew up on the left, and two companies which he sent to the right, foreseeing, (as he says he did,) that at these points the enemy would make their last effort." Major Wells, who commanded on the left flank, "*not knowing General Harrison's intentions, precisely*, had taken the command of these companies, and charged the enemy, before the general had formed the dragoons, with which he meant to support the infantry." *The Indians were routed and driven by Major Wells*—but certainly, this gallant achievement of his, could not be placed to the credit of the military skill of General Harrison, who did not even direct it, and of whose intentions the gallant Wells was ignorant at the time he made the movement. Captain Cook and Lieutenant Larabee having arrived on the right flank with their companies, and being joined by the riflemen of that flank, charged the Indians, killed a number, and put the rest to a precipitate flight. But neither this gallant act, which drove the Indians entirely off, and terminated the engagement, could be given to the credit of General Harrison, as he does not claim to have ordered it, and he states himself to have been engaged, at the time, on the other flank. Thus examining the conduct of General Harrison at Tippecanoe, from the account furnished by himself, it appears he had little hand in the movements which resulted in the dispersing of the Indians, and that every charge that was made by his forces upon them, except the one conducted by Major Daviess, (8.)

(8.) The following has appeared in the "*Log Cabin*," as a note to an extract from Burr's Life of Harrison; and if it is true, then even the attack made by Major Daviess, did not originate with Gen. Harrison; and therefore, whether that act brought honor or blame, it should not be charged to Gen. Harrison.

"Upon the first alarm, the Governor mounted his horse, and proceeded toward the point of attack; and finding the line much weakened there, he ordered two companies from the centre of the rear line to march up, and form across the angle in the rear of Barton's and Geiger's companies. In passing through the camp toward the left of the front line, he met with Major Daviess, who informed him that the Indians, concealed behind

which was a peculiarly unfortunate one, was made without any directions from him. Hence, it is plain and palpable, that the arrangement of the army, in which there was exhibited so much remissness and weakness, as to *provoke the savages to make their attack*, was the offspring of the mind of General Harrison, himself, while all those gallant acts which repulsed the enemy, and put them to flight, were performed without his direction, and *would have all been done, if he had not been there.*

That the forces of General Harrison should have conducted themselves with coolness and determined bravery in the defence of this camp, was to be expected—for they were brave men; and, then, they had no choice—as it was death or victory.

There was some attempt by General Harrison, in drawing up his account of the Battle of Tippecanoe, to gloss over his extremely culpable conduct in that unfortunate and deplorable affair; and with this view he exultingly adds a postscript to his letter, in which he states "that not a man of his was taken prisoner; and that of three scalps taken by the Indians, two of them were recovered." To say nothing of the fact that the Indians had been permitted to penetrate his lines, and to kill *and scalp* his men within his camp—it was a very strange matter to boast of, "*that the Indians took none of his men prisoners!*" when it is well understood, that even with belligerents who are civilized, it is not usual for the party making an assault to take prisoners until they shall have become successful, and that *the savages seldom take prisoners in battle at all*; and the more strange was his boasting, when he accompanied it with the statement, that his loss amounted to *one hundred and eighty-eight*, killed and wounded, while of the Indians, all he could make out, was *forty-six* killed, and *one* wounded; which one, was all the prisoner taken by his army.

In a letter to the Secretary of War, dated *Prophet's Town*, Nov. 8, 1811, General Harrison, after announcing the attack which had been made on him at that place by the Indians, says, "their precipitate retreat, leaving a number of their warriors dead on the field, and the subsequent abandonment of their town, attest for us a complete and decisive victory!" and such a victory! Having thrown himself a willing sacrifice within the grasp of the savages, presenting before them every inducement to attempt his surprise; and, then, when his men, roused from their slumbers by the yells of the savages, were enabled by their

some trees near the line, were annoying the troops very severely in that quarter, and requested permission to dislodge them. In attempting this exploit he fell mortally wounded, as did Col. Isaac White of Indiana, who acted as a volunteer in his troop."—*Judge Hall.*

own superior prowess, to repel them—but not without the loss of many of the most valuable citizens of our country—shall General Harrison for this, be dubbed a hero? The Indians having been repulsed, abandoned their town, and when it contained not a savage, General Harrison took possession of it, and of 5000 bushels of corn, and then burned the town; but the Indians had previously captured and carried off all his beef, and a great number of his horses; (9.) and with this result, and no other, ended the campaign; and do such services give him claims to the suffrages of our people?

After thus reviewing the conduct of General Harrison, in his campaign against the Indians, I cannot regard it otherwise than as discreditable to himself as a military commander, and extremely unfortunate in its result to our country. The fall of the brave men whom he sacrificed at Tippecanoe, was really a national loss. The Indians were in no manner humbled. In the next season, (1812,) we found them equally hostile, arrayed against us with our worse than savage foes—the British. The conduct of General Harrison is the more to be condemned from the fact, that the effusion of blood might have been avoided if he had pursued a prompt, energetic and vigilant course towards the Indians from the moment of his arriving within their country. As no reasonable person can doubt that it was his remissness and his vascilating course with the Indians, which provoked them to attempt his destruction by surprise; and what advantage resulted to our country from the destruction of 5000 bushels of corn, (which had been produced by the labor of the women of the Indians, for their own and their children's support,) and the burning of their houses in the edge of winter? None, certainly; unless the immediate driving of the savages to the British, where they were clothed and fed, and then arrayed against us, might be regarded as such! As a benevolent act, it could not be highly estimated, when we reflect that it might have been avoided!

Such, sir, is a picture of General Harrison as a military chief. It exhibits him as a

(9.) *The Tippecanoe Text-Book*, says:—

"After the battle, Governor Harrison took possession of about five thousand bushels of corn, belonging to the Indians, and burned the Prophet's Town," and cites Niles' Register, Vol. I. page 238, where I read the following:—

"Hunter, (one of General Harrison's adjutants,) states that the Indians got all their beef, and a great number of their horses; they got about five thousand bushels of corn, and burned the Prophet's Town the day after the action."

In every publication of the British Whigs, I detect deceptions like this. I find they have also given as the killed and wounded at Tippecanoe, of the Americans, a much less number than General Harrison.

governor and a general while, in the proudest days of his manhood and the fullest vigor of his life and is he shown to be such a man as you would choose, now that he is in the sere and yellow leaf, as the chief magistrate of our country, and the commander-in-chief of our armies? Was his conduct at Tippecanoe such as should give him honor—and that should be held in remembrance by the formation of Tippecanoe clubs? Were his deeds there, such as should be celebrated with processions, banners, badges and songs? If for such conduct as that displayed by General Harrison at Tippecanoe, men are to be dubbed *heroes*, and to receive honor and praise, then, indeed, sir, we may ask, *what is the price of honor, and what is the value of glory and fame?*

In this *critique* on the conduct of General Harrison, (reported by himself,) at the battle of Tippecanoe, (which I have drawn up with the single motive of exhibiting his fitness to meet the responsibilities and to perform the duties of the office for which he is proposed, and not with a desire to treat him with any personal disrespect,) I have exhibited a fair representation of the man at *thirty-eight* years of age, and his capacity for high responsibilities at that time. I will now pass over *twenty-nine* years of his life, by briefly noticing his several performances as a military chieftain, and show you what he is with *sixty-seven* years marked upon his brow, (10.) that you may, sir, judge of his capacity now to perform any high trusts; but with his private character I claim not to meddle.

A short time since, during the present month, as you will have seen by the newspapers, the British Whigs of Ohio, Indiana and Michigan, congregated at Perrysburgh, (Fort Meigs), in a large body, to hear a speech from General Harrison. The meeting was said to have been convened for the purpose of celebrating the anniversary of "a victory achieved by the American arms over those of Great Britain," (as an affair has been called which took place during the late war, on that ground, between the military forces of the two nations,) yet it is well known that the meeting was got up by the British Whigs, for the purpose of being made to serve the interest of their party, and that General Harrison was brought there expressly in order to enable them to make an exhibition of their candidate for the presidency, for whom they claim merit, not so much for his talents and capacity now to serve the people, as for his *past services*, for which reasons General Harrison, instead of declaring his views in relation to any of the great political questions engrossing the public mind, and which form the distinctive characters of the two

(10.) In a recent speech made at a public meeting in Ohio, by Gen. Harrison, he stated himself to be 67 years of age.

political parties, confined himself in his speech to a statement of his own services, in the relation of which, however, he avowed some principles deserving of consideration and remark.

I have no desire to trifle with a subject so grave and important in its bearing as this I have under consideration, but I cannot refrain from stating the fact, that while perusing this speech of General Harrison, my mind involuntarily reverted to a story I had once read, in a work entitled *Gil Blas*, by Le Sage, wherein it was related that on a time when an old and imbecile bishop had been holding forth to a congregation, it was said by some, "that his sermon had the apoplexy;" and then the impression forced itself upon me, that General Harrison's speech might also have a little touch of the apoplexy about it.

Having enumerated, but not described, his own important services—(which our country had not before been advised of, nor does it now acknowledge,) services which he claims to have rendered at the Thames, at Seneca Town and at Fort Meigs; (at which places, however, by his vascillating and unficer like conduct he created a disaffection among his forces, amounting almost to a mutiny; and then, when there were serious imputations resting against him, and in circulation throughout the state of Ohio, instead of throwing himself upon a court of inquiry, for an investigation of his conduct, as it is customary with military commanders, he caused his inferior and subordinate officers to sign a certificate of character, (11.) a proceeding most extraordinary in its course and unbecoming the character

(11.) Extract of a letter from Col. Croghan to General Harrison:

"*New-Orleans, May 24, 1825.*

"Sir—I unwillingly renew our correspondence, which I had thought finally closed with my letter of the 13th Aug. 1818, and that I do so, will be received by you as an evidence that my feelings towards you are at least not hostile. Did I not literally sacrifice myself to save you? Did I not, at a moment when the excitement against you throughout the whole state of Ohio, amounting to general clamor, when there was almost mutiny in your very camp at Seneca, do every thing that you and your friends required of me as necessary to reinstate you in the good opinion of the people and of the army? The success of our army required that you, the general-in-chief, should have the confidence of all; and to insure that, I signed addresses, without reading them, because I was told that it was necessary; wrote letters approving throughout your conduct, and subject to your corrections, without asking what they might be, because I was assured by members of your family that you yourself believed that on my expressions in relation to you much depended. But of what I did for you, enough—of what you have done for me, there is nothing to be told. You have personally pledged yourself to correct any false impressions that may have been created by the publication of the two works above mentioned; in a word, to speak of all things in relation to the transactions in Sandusky as they deserve."

of a commander of an army.) General Harrison made the following notable declaration :

"Feeling my *responsibility*, I personally supervised and directed the arrangement of the army under my command. I trusted to no colonel or other officer. *No [other] person had any hand in any disposition of the army.* Every step of warfare, whether for good or ill, was taken *under my own direction*, and by none other." (11.)

If this statement, egotistical and egregiously false as it is, had been made in relation to General Harrison's *responsibilities* as one of our military commanders, by some of his political friends, who made no pretensions to a knowledge of the details of an army, it might have passed well enough for a political puff. But coming as it does, directly from the mouth of a man who has passed, as he there stated, through all grades from "a Lieutenant under Wayne, in 1793, to that of Major-General and Commander-in-Chief of the North Western Army, nineteen years after," I can conceive no apology for it, and I am utterly unable to account for such statement, by a person who has commanded an army, unless it be charged to the imbecility of age.

If you have hopes for your country, you must found those hopes upon the probable result of a conflict of arms, as experience has shown that blood is the only price of political freedom. Then, though I would not have you frightened by the vain boastings of an old man, just after taking a swig of *hard cider*, (13.) yet, sir, elect General Harrison President of these United States, and you will have him *established* a HERO! and these remarks of his I have quoted, as well as every other foolish thing he may have been induced to utter in relation to military operations, will be chronicled by the people of this country and of the Canadas, who are not the best instructed in the manner of the operations of the battle field, as the opinions of a *sage* in military affairs. Let these statements of his own proceedings be accepted as a rule, and reckless, indeed, must be that man of his reputation and fame, who would attempt to organize or command an army

(12.) What did General Harrison say, when he was not quite *so old*? Read his speech in the United States Senate, February 16, 1827, on the project of establishing a naval school. Here is an extract:

"I feel proud to say, that the defence of Fort Meigs, at which I commanded, CHIEFLY depended upon the *scientific exertions* of a man to whom it is due that his worth should here be attested by me. I allude to the late Major Wood, a man who combined many valuable qualities, and who bade fair to have risen to a high point of professional eminence. *Your commander had not sufficient science to have successfully defended the fort without the ASSISTANCE of that individual.*"

(13.) General Harrison, while speaking at Fort Meigs, took a drink of *hard cider*. So says the British Whig papers.

in this country or the Canadas, which should be composed of Americans. If a commander should follow the course declared to have been pursued by General Harrison, "and trusted no colonel or other officer," and assumed those duties himself which are usually performed by the commanders of divisions and brigades, the chiefs of battalions, the commanders of companies, and the officers and non-commissioned officers of squads, he would without any doubt, *feel his responsibilities*. But where shall that man be found, (after the race of the Harrison's are gone,) of no more than human strength and human intellect, with the versatility of talents and ubiquity of character, that shall enable him to shoulder such giant *responsibilities*? Such responsibilities would have been refused by a Cæsar, and a Hannibal, or a Scipio would have hesitated to assume them.

By his declaration as well as by his military operations, General Harrison has set at nought all those rules of the art of war which have been established on the experience of a Fredrick, a Marlborough and a Wolf, and which have been improved upon by Steuben, Washington and Napoleon. Harrison, a major-general, and a commander-in-chief, and he, forsooth! **PERSONALLY SUPERVISE AND DIRECT** the arrangement of his whole army! The idea is ridiculous! But if it were so, why! then, there should have been some little saving to government in the expense of stationary, as the reports of the officers and sergeants of guards—adjutants' returns—brigade majors' reports—and adjutant generals' reports might have all been dispensed with; as the necessity for them was entirely superceded by the *personal directing* of the commanding general, who was able to give all those matters, in one single general report of the army.

Napoleon said, "give me good field officers, whom I can trust, and I will show you an army." The field officers of an army are its sinews, and without able and trusty persons to fill those stations, any force would be but a mob, liable to be broken at the moment of attack, and capable of effecting nothing. But General Harrison declares that he "trusted no Colonel or other officer." When, before this have we heard a military commander attributing to himself the whole credit of his movements, and telling his countrymen that his officers and soldiers, without whose exertions he could do nothing, were entitled to no merit in the action? Think you that a Washington or a Jackson would have spoken thus?(14.)

(14.) When Colonel Johnson was received on a recent occasion in the city of New-York, he made a speech in reply to the address of Alderman Purdy, in behalf of the Common Council, from which I extract the following manly and honorable sentiment:

"I do, sir, take this much to myself—I have served my country, but

It is an adage with military men, "*that many good officers make a good general*;" and any one who possesses the smallest knowledge of the details of an army, must be aware that it is but little that a military chieftain (15.) can effect unless he has good officers, in numbers, in whom he can trust. To the want of such, the failure of the Canadians in all their late revolutionary movements, is mainly attributable.

The brigadiers and colonels of an army, are the proper advisers of the commander-in-chief. It is them, and not him, who have the immediate command of the battalions, and who lead them into action; and if the general would not trust the colonels, why! they would not trust the general. Let any commander-in-chief of an army assume to himself to play colonel as well as chieftain, and he would find himself very soon without colonels. Let him attempt *personally to supervise and direct the arrangement* of the battalions, and his chiefs of battalions would leave him as immediately as did General Harrison, himself, abandon the service of the United States during the late war,

the merit of my short military career must be shared with others. I never allow myself, Mr. President, to be complimented on an occasion like the present, without remembering the brave corps who shared with me the perils and dangers of the common cause."

What would Wolfe have said of such a statement, who, on the 2d of September, 1758, while he was with the British army before Quebec, wrote to Mr. Pitt as follows: "I begged the general officers* to consult together for the public utility. *They are of opinion*, that as more ships and provisions are now yet above the town, they should try, by carrying a corps of four or five thousand men, which is nearly the whole strength of the army, after the points of Lévi and Orleans were left in a proper state of defence, to draw the enemy from their present situation, and to bring them to an action. *I have acquiesced in the proposal*, and we are preparing to put it in execution:" and again on the 9th of September, he wrote to Mr. Pitt as follows: "I begged the generals to consider among themselves, what was fittest to be done. *Their sentiments were unanimous*, that (as the easterly winds begin to blow, and ships can pass the town in the night with provisions, artillery, &c.,) we should endeavor, by carrying a considerable corps into the upper river, to draw them from their inaccessible situation, and bring them to an action. *I agreed to the proposal*; and we are now here with about three thousand six hundred men, waiting an opportunity to attack them, when and wherever they can be got at?" and what, I ask, would any military man say to such a statement as this of General Harrison's?

*All the colonels in chief of regiments in the British army, are also generals.

(15.) The Mamlukes of Egypt have but one officer—a single despotic master—and for a warm attachment to whom they are remarked, and whose fortunes they generally follow with unwearied constancy. "But the Mamlukes," says Volney, the historian, "have no order, discipline

because he found *himself not trusted by President Madison.* (16.)

In all well organized armies, *responsibility* is attached to the stations of all, from the commander-in-chief, down to the common sentinel; and the idea of efficiency in any military force, where the commander-in-chief "trusts no colonel or other officer," is about as sensible as the following which appears in the *Tippecanoe Text-Book*, from General Harrison's recently published life:

"It was justly remarked by a distinguished political writer immediately after the victory of the Thames, [an affair to which General Harrison did not happen to get nigher than two miles distant,] that General Harrison had added a new manœuvre to the science of military tactics—CHARGING BAYONET ON HORSEBACK!" (17.)

or subordination. Their troops are a mob—their march a riot—their battles, duels, and their war a scene of robbery and plunder; and experience has proved them totally inadequate to combat with the organized cavalry of Europe, though their whole lives have been spent in military exercises; and such would be the character of any force thus organized.

(16.) On this point, allow me to show an extract from a "Life of Harrison," published by his political friends. It is thus:

"In the plan for the ensuing campaign, to the surprise of the public, General Harrison was designated for a service far removed from any post of danger, and inferior to that which he had a right to expect. Regardless of the memorable victories(?) which this gallant and experienced officer had won, and unmindful of the various and important services which he had rendered to his country, the secretary of war, (Armstrong,) saw fit to assign to him the command of a district, where he would be compelled to remain inactive, while others were appointed to those more arduous duties which he had heretofore performed with so much honor to himself and to the nation. As if still unsatisfied with this egregious insult, which he had offered to General Harrison, Secretary Armstrong, on the 25th of April, 1814, appointed a subordinate officer to a separate command within his district, and at the same time, *opened a correspondence with the subalterns of the army under his command; and even went so far as to issue orders to them directly, instead of communicating his orders through the commander, a course which good discipline required to be observed, and which all previous practice had sanctioned.* On the receipt of this intelligence, General Harrison instantly addressed a letter to the Secretary, *tendering his resignation, with a notification thereof to the President.*"

I will not urge that General Harrison acted improperly for a man who had not confidence in his own capacity, when he tendered his resignation: for it does seem that the course of conduct pursued by the then administration towards him, was a very frank indication on the part of the government, that his services were no longer desired—or at least, that they were not held in any very high estimation! But, why should he have complained, if he had treated his own officers in the same manner, as he says he did? The President was the commander-in-chief of the whole military force of the nation, and it was as just for him to put no trust in General Harrison, as it was for General Harrison to put no trust in the officers who were placed under his command!

(17.) If a commander-in-chief trusts "no colonel or other officer" with

The only advancement of any principle made by General Harrison in his speech at Fort Meigs, was a declaration in favor of the pension system—and the claim of a pension for himself.

There is no principle more at variance with republican institutions, than that of *granting pensions to individuals for services performed as public officers*. Of monarchy, the pension system is the foundation, and of an aristocracy, it is its pillars. In Great Britain it has been used, as well as in all other nations of Europe, to sustain the prerogative of the crown, and a titled nobility; and one of its most recent acts has been to take from the pockets of the laboring people of Great Britain, an annual sum of \$10,000, and to bestow the same upon Sir John Colborn, with the title of Lord Seaton, as a reward for having murdered and destroyed your people, and laid waste your country. But for the system of granting pensions, which is used by monarchical and aristocratical governments as a license to rob the many to enrich the few, the oppressed millions would no longer live in abject and degraded servitude, but according to the laws of their own being, would fully enjoy the birthright of their creation. To assume it here, would soon put an end to civil liberty in our country; and if it could be supposed that the people of your country were willing to re-establish a system, so destructive in its operations to political freedom, I believe that the desire which is now entertained by a large portion of the people of the United States, for the liberation of your country from the domination of Great Britain, would then cease to exist.

"I see my old companions here," said General Harrison. "Would to God that it had been in my power, to have made them comfortable and happy—that their sun might go down in peace. But, fellow-citizens, they remain unprovided for—*monuments of the ingratitude of my country!* It was with the greatest difficulty, that the existing pension act, was passed through Congress. [The act granting pensions to the soldiers of the revolution.] Why were the brave soldiers who fought under Wayne, excluded? Soldiers, who suffered far more, than they who fought in the revolution proper.

* * * * *

"I can only say," continued he, "that if it should ever be in my power to pay the debt which is due these brave, but neglected men, that debt shall first of all, be paid."

the arrangements of his army, and he falls at the moment he is attacked by an enemy, the army must necessarily be defeated from the want of a second officer, acquainted with its details, to command. Such was the condition of most of the ancient Greek armies; and the loss of their chief generally proved the loss of the battle. But, the history of the military operations of more modern times, where the armies have not consisted of mere "master and slaves," but officers and soldiers, intelligent, and duly informed of the matters in which they were engaged, and all having their *trusts and their responsibilities*, gives us accounts of many battles, among which I might name that of the Plains of Abraham, where victories have been achieved by armies after their chief had fallen.

In granting pensions to the soldiers of the revolution, our government did but give them their pay for their services, which they had not before received. The amount *was due* them. Not so with the soldiers who served under Wayne. They received their wages in good and current money; and there was no impropriety "in excluding the soldiers who fought under Wayne," while pensions were bestowed on those "who fought in the revolution," for their claims were debts which we owed to men who had perilled their lives for the inestimable blessings which we now enjoy, not in the ordinary capacity of soldiers—but they had battled for us against *British executioners*, by whom, if they had been subdued, they would have been led to the scaffold!

"I have said," says General Harrison, "that the soldiers under Wayne experienced greater hardships, even than the soldiers of the revolution—and it is so." If, in this, General Harrison speaks the truth, then, indeed, has all history on the subject lied. The soldiers of every army have to endure more or less of privations. But where could the soldiers of Wayne's army have endured privations and sufferings, which should compare with those of the soldiers of the revolution?

If pensions were granted by our government to the Indian warriors who served under Wayne, are there not other classes now and like to be still more, of Indian warriors, whose claims are as just as theirs? May not those who served at Tippecanoe, those who served with Johnson at the Thames, those who served with Jackson in the Seminole war, and those who are now on services in the Floridas, put in equal claims? In think so, and that we might go on and pension half the nation if we should once adopt and act upon General Harrison's principle, which is like unto John Randolph's—i. e. "*five loaves and two fishes*." For you must understand that if pensions were granted to those who served in Wayne's army, it is WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON who would gain the most by it, as he, a captain in that army, would hold the first place on the list of the highest grade of pensioners, which would secure to him the comfortable allowance of FORTY DOLLARS PER MONTH, for the remainder of his life, and this added to the \$200,000 he has already received from the public treasury of "his ungrateful country," would unquestionably make him quite "happy," and allow "his sun to go down in peace."

Now, sir, if it is shown, (as asserted in a number of British Whig papers in 1836,) "*that General Harrison is a man of no particular respectability of character, wholly obscure as to talents, and decidedly insignificant, so far as needed abilities are concerned, for the high office for which he is proposed,*" and that he has avowed notions in regard to military operations, which if adopted as a

criterion, would have the effect to frustrate any military movements which might hereafter be attempted to achieve the independence of the Canadas, these afford a good reason why you, as well as every other well wisher of our democratic institutions, ought not to desire his elevation to the Chief Magistracy of this nation.

The high station, which was first filled by a Washington and then by a Jefferson, should never be occupied but by men of "superior and splendid talents," whose political opinions are well known and established by a long public career. Such is conceded to Mr. Van Buren, even by his political opponents; and the British Whig party have many such men in their ranks. They number with their party, men of the most splendid talents in the Union; yet they propose no such man to the people as a candidate for the presidency, but offer an individual who is confessedly destitute of all such qualities, whom they cause to assume as many shapes as Proteus, and to profess every manner of principle to suit their purposes in the different sections of our country. Is not this then, evidence not to be doubted, that the British Whig party entertain principles so adverse to the true interests of our people, that they dare not go to them with a candidate for their suffrages who has been identified with those principles? So it presents itself to me. From such a party you have no favors to expect for the cause of your country; and should they so far succeed in their course of fraud with our people, as to obtain the election of General Harrison, we shall find that a residence in the WHITE HOUSE at Washington, will no more constitute him an able and high minded President, than the wearing of a sword would make him a great general; and, then, among the evils to our country which would result from the elevation of a man of ordinary talents and capacity, it would not be the least, that it increases the number of aspirants, and forms a precedent for men of small parts to put themselves up for this high station—which is lessened in its value as often as it is filled by inferior men. But, as the people of these United States have heretofore determined that they would not trust the administration of our government in the hands of either Henry Clay or Daniel Webster—I am not yet prepared to believe that they can be so cheated as to allow those same individuals, under the name of William Henry Harrison, to seize upon the reins of the government.

Sir, I am,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

TH: J. SUTHERLAND.

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